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SAFE AND SOUND: THE CASE FOR SAFETY
AND HEALTH COMMITTEES UNDER OSHA
AND THE NLRA
Gregory R. Watchmant
I. INTRODUCTION
A. IMPERIAL FOOD AND EQUITY MEATS: FATAL DIFFERENCES
On the morning of Tuesday, September 3, 1991, the resi-
dents of Reidsville, North Carolina, awoke after a three-day
Labor Day weekend of parades, barbecues, and softball games.
For many of the town's residents, that Tuesday marked the end
of summer, the beginning of a new school year, and a return to
their jobs at the town's poultry processing plant owned by
Equity Meats.
Roughly one hundred miles to the south, workers in the
rural community of Hamlet, North Carolina returned that
morning to a similar poultry processing plant owned by Imperial
Food Products. Hamlet, a sleepy small town with a four-block
Main Street, had been designated the previous year as an All-
American city.1 The poultry plant, which paid workers between
$4.25 and $5.50 an hour, had been a source of employment in
Hamlet for over a decade.2
Despite their outward similarities, major differences existed
between the two plants - indeed, fatal differences. Employees
of Equity Meats in Reidsville participated in a joint employer-
employee safety and health committee (SHC), required by the
company's collective bargaining agreement with Local 204 of the
t B. A. 1981, Williams College; J.D. 1985, Cornell Law School. The author
wrote this article while in the position of Chief Labor Counsel, United States
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Labor.
He is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and
Health, U.S. Department of Labor.
1 Paul Taylor, 25 Die as Fire Hits N.C. Poultry Plant; Locked Doors Are
Said to Add to Toll, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1991, at Al.
2 Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, and the Fire
at the Imperial Food Products Plant in Hamlet, North Carolina: Hearing on
H.R. 3160 before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 27, 55 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Prod-
ucts Fire] (testimony of Margaret Seminario, Director of Occupational Safety
and Health, AFL-CIO; testimony of Bobby Charles Quick).
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United Food and Commercial Workers Union.' The SHC's
membership included five rank-and-file employees and five
management representatives.4 Equity Meats' SHC conducted
periodic fire drills to familiarize employees with escape routes,5
regularly checked for locked or blocked exit doors, and ensured
routine maintenance of hydraulic lines to prevent fire-producing
ruptures.6
At Imperial Food in Hamlet, however, no SHC existed.
Furthermore, federal and state safety and health officials never
inspected the plant.' The company did not maintain a fire
safety plan, fire alarm, or sprinkler system,8 and had never
conducted safety training or fire drills.9 Imperial Food kept the
plant doors locked and did not equip them with panic bars to
allow them to be opened in emergencies. ° Workers knew of
these dangerous conditions but believed that they would be fired
if they complained." In short, the Imperial Food plant was a
disaster waiting to happen.
At 8:20 that Tuesday morning, a rupture occurred in a
hydraulic line that powered a conveyor belt through a deep fat
fryer. The spilled fuel ignited, triggering a flash fire and filling
the plant with thick, black smoke. Workers rushed to the one-
story plant's nine exits, but found many of them blocked or
locked. 2 Passersby outside the plant heard their screams for
help but could not open the doors. 3 Many workers died trying
to find their way out of the plant through the thick black
'Id. at 46 (testimony of Tom LaNier, Member, United Food and Com-
mercial Workers Union Local 204).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 49, 53 (statement and testimony of Tom LaNier).
'Id. at 30 (testimony of Margaret Seminario, Director of Occupational
Safety and Health, AFL-CIO).
8 Id. at 56 (testimony of Loretta Goodwin and Bobby Charles Quick).
9 Id. at 52, 57.
0Id. at 52 (testimony of Bobby Charles Quick).
n Paul Taylor, Ashes and Accusations, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at Al,
A9; see also 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Products Fire, supra note
2 at 55, 58 (testimony of Loretta Goodwin and Bobby Charles Quick).
12 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Products Fire, supra note 2, at 39-
40, 101 (testimony of Loretta Goodwin and Bobby Charles Quick).
" Id. at 39 (testimony of Loretta Goodwin).
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smoke.14 One firefighter pulled out a victim who turned out to
be his father.15 The fire killed twenty-five workers and injured
another fifty-five in a matter of minutes, making it the worst
industrial accident in North Carolina's history."
B. SAFETY ON THE JOB: A BURGEONING PUBLIC POLICY CRISIS
The fire at Imperial Food Products triggered a flurry of
federal and state government activity. Federal and state occu-
pational safety and health officials descended on Hamlet and
launched an immediate investigation the day of the fire. 7 In
Washington, D.C., the House Education and Labor Committee
initiated a congressional inquiry. The Committee held a hear-
ing nine days after the fire and later produced a report on the
disaster." The Governor of North Carolina testified before the
Committee, expressing support for safety and health committees
and concluding that SHCs "clearly... would have helped" save
lives at Imperial Food.'9 The U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration announced its assumption of joint juris-
diction over North Carolina employers, who until then had been
covered exclusively by North Carolina's state occupational safety
and health agency.2
North Carolina's Commissioner of Labor levied $808,000 in
civil fines against Imperial Food for eighty-three safety and
14 Id. at 40 (testimony of Loretta Goodwin).
15 Id.
16 STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 102D CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE TRAGEDY AT IMPERIAL FOOD PRODUCTS 2 (Comm. Print 1991).
' See 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Products Fire, supra note 2,
at 139 (testimony of Gerard F. Scannell, Assistant Secretary for Occupational
Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor). Federal OSHA officials also
inspected another Imperial Food plant in Georgia, and assessed $144,500 in
fines. OSHA cited the company for not maintaining a fire extinguishing
system, not conducting fire drills or training, and locking exit doors. OSHA
Cites Imperial Plant in Georgia for Alleged Fire Safety Violations, [1992) Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at A-2 (Jan. 29, 1992).
8 See 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Products Fire, supra note 2;
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 102D CONG., 2D SEss., supra
note 16.
19 1991 House Hearing on Imperial Food Products Fire, supra note 2, at
126 (testimony of James G. Martin, Governor of North Carolina).
20 Press Release from U.S. Dep't of Labor (Oct. 23, 1991).
1994]
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health violations.2 The plant's owner, director of plant opera-
tions, and manager were indicted for involuntary manslaugh-
ter." The plant's owner plead guilty to two counts of involun-
tary manslaughter in 1992 and was sentenced to nineteen years
and eleven months in prison.' North Carolina enacted legisla-
tion requiring employers with poor safety records to establish
SHCs. 4 Workers and their families brought numerous civil
suits against Imperial Food." The lawsuits ultimately settled
in 1992 for $15.1 million.26
After the Imperial Food tragedy, federal and state officials
and the national media closely scrutinized the plant's dangerous
conditions. In light of all the attention, most assumed such
working conditions to be unusual. In reality, however, condi-
tions at the Hamlet plant typified thousands of U.S. workplaces.
The Hamlet fire illuminates the nation's neglect of workplace
safety and health issues and underscores the growing incapacity
of federal and state agencies to enforce the law.
A quarter century ago, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSH Act)27 marked the first comprehensive feder-
al effort to regulate workplace safety and health. It sought "to
21 See Three Indicted for Fatal Fire at North Carolina Poultry Plant, [1992]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at A-2 (Mar. 11, 1992) (citing North Carolina v.
Roe, No. 92-CRS-1799 (N.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 9, 1992)).
22 Id.
' North Carolina Chicken Plant Owner Pleads Guilty to Manslaughter
Charges, [1992] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 179, at A-11 (Sept. 15, 1992).
Charges against the director of plant operations and the plant manager were
dismissed. Id.
' N.C. General Assembly Enacts Bills on Workplace Safety, Health, [1992]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 138, at A-12 (July 17, 1992) (discussing passage of
H.B. 1388).
' Imperial Poultry Plant Will Not Reopen, [1991] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 200, at A-20 (Oct. 16, 1991); see, e.g., Imperial Foods Accused of Gross
Negligence in Civil Suit Filed on Behalf of 23 Workers, [1991] Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 203, at A-3 (Oct. 21, 1991) (citing Albright v. Imperial Food Prods.
Inc., No. 3:91-CV-00523 (M.D.N.C. fied Oct. 17, 1991)); Families of Imperial
Fire Victims Agree to Tentative Settlement of $15.1 Million, [1991] Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 218, at A-15 (Nov. 10, 1992) (citing Saunders v. Imperial Food
Prods. Inc., No. 91-CVS-826 (N.C. Super. Ct. fied Nov. 5, 1992)).
2
' Families of Imperial Fire Victims Agree to Tentative Settlement of $15.1
Million, supra note 25, at A-15.
27 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
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assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions."'
While the United States may have achieved some progress
since 1970 in the reduction of job-related fatalities, 9 the num-
bers remain staggeringly high and the OSH Act's promise
remains largely unfulfilled. Despite tremendous advances in
technology and medical science, thousands of Americans die
from work-related causes each year. 0 The number of lives lost
to safety accidents and occupational illnesses on an average
working day in this country dwarfs the twenty-five lives lost in
the Hamlet fire. An additional 3.3 mllion American workers
suffer disabling injuries on the job each year, 1 while occupa-
tional illness and injury rates continue to rise. 2
Each workplace fatality represents a tragedy for the worker
involved and for his or her family. Each injury or occupational
8 Id. § 651(b).
' See, e.g., The Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform
Act: Hearings on S. 575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1994) (testimony of Robert B. Reich,
U.S. Secretary of Labor).
30 See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 1 (1993) (estimating
8,500 deaths in 1992 from work-related accidents) S. REP. No. 453, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) ("Each year, 10,000 workers are killed in workplace
accidents, and as many as 100,000 more die from workplace illnesses"); 2 The
Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, 1991: Hearings
on H.R. 3160 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 [hereinafter 1991-92 House Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Philip J.
Landrigan, Chair, Department of Community Medicine, Mount Sinai School of
Medicine) (estimating 50,000 to 70,000 deaths annually from exposure to toxic
substances in the workplace); NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INST., BEYOND
NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN THE U.S. 8 (1990)
(estimating between 47,377 and 95,479 American deaths from occupational
disease in 1987); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, No.
OTA-H-256, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY IN THE WORKPACE 37(1985)
("The most commonly quoted estimates are that up to 100,000 deaths" occur
each year due to occupational illness; citing estimates ranging from 10,000 to
210,000 deaths annually); Phillip J. Landrigan & Dean B. Baker, The Recogni-
tion and Control of Occupational Disease, 266 JAMA 676,676 (1991) (estimat-
ing 100,000 deaths annually from occupational disease) (citing PRESIDENT'S
REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1972)).
11 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 1.
32 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 95-97
(1994); Job-Related Injuries, Illnesses Increase, [1993] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 240, at A-10 (Dec. 16, 1993) (noting that rise in work-related injuries and
illnesses rate from 8.4 to 8.9 cases per 100 full-time workers represents largest
increase in two decades).
1994]
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illness produces devastating consequences as well, ranging from
pain and suffering to permanent disability. These incidents also
exact a huge toll on the U.S. economy. The National Safety
Council estimates that the direct costs of work-related acci-
dents - not including occupational illnesses and associated
fatalities - amounted to $115.9 billion in 1992.33 As a nation
facing increasingly stiff global competition, the United States
cannot afford these costs.
These statistics have begun to attract the attention of
federal policymakers. In 1991, the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health (NIOSH) convened a task force on
occupational injury prevention. The task force assessed the
impact of workplace accidents and illnesses on workers, busi-
nesses, and the economy, and concluded that "[o]ccupational
injury [in the United States] is a public health crisis that
demands immediate attention.
34
The NIOSH task force's report received scant attention, but
the Hamlet fire has sounded the alarm. The image of dozens of
workers trapped behind locked fire exits - choking on thick,
black smoke and unable to escape - struck a deep chord with
members of Congress and the national media. The tragedy at
Imperial Food demonstrated the limits of federal and state
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 2. NSC's estimate
includes wage and productivity losses, medical expenses, administrative
expenses, motor vehicle damage, fire loss, and other employer costs. Id; see
also Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on
S. 1622 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 151 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Susan
Marquis, Senior Economist, Rand Institute for Civil Justice) (estimating that
workplace injuries cost employers, workers and taxpayers $83 billion in 1989);
Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on S.
575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (July 14, 1993) (testimony of Dr. J. Donald Millar, Director, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) (total workers' compensation
payments exceeded $42 billion in 1991); 1992 Senate Hearings, supra at 181
(testimony of Stacy Hennessy Moot, Associate Counsel, American Insurance
Association) (citing indirect costs such as lower productivity, damaged equip-
ment and materials, disrupted schedules, loss of customers and public good-
will, and the hiring and training of new employees; noting that "any work-
related accident.., cuts into a company's profit margin").
" See Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act:
Hearings on S. 1622 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 Senate Hearings] (Position Paper, Panel on Occupational Injury Pre-
vention).
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enforcement efforts, and confirmed the need for a new public
policy approach to protect American workers.
C. COSHRA's LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: SAFETY AND
HEALTH COMMITTEES
The Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform
Act (COSHRA), a proposed legislative overhaul of the OSH Act
-recently under consideration in Congress,"5 embodies a new
approach to workplace safety and health. Forming the heart of
COSHRA's new approach is the requirement that all employers
with eleven or more employees establish joint SHCs comprised
of both management and employee representatives. COSHRA
empowers the SHC to review the employer's safety and health
program and records, to investigate incidents resulting in
illness, injury, or death, to conduct inspections, and to recom-
mend improvements in worker protection to the employer.
This article evaluates the benefits of SHCs from the stand-
point of both workplace safety and health and labor-manage-
ment relations. While COSHRA's SHC requirement represents
a new public policy approach to workplace safety and health
issues, SHCs are by no means new. SHCs represent perhaps
the most prevalent form of employee involvement in the Ameri-
can workplace today. Twelve states currently require some or
all employers to establish SHCs. 6 Thousands of other employ-
ers have established SHCs voluntarily or pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements. 7
A review of this broad-based experience with SHCs yields
substantial evidence - both systemic and anecdotal - that
35 137 CONG. REC. S11,833 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (introduction of S. 1622
by Sens. Kennedy & Metzenbaum); 137 CoNG. REC. H6316 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1991) (introduction of H.R. 3160 by Rep. Ford). During the 102d Congress,
both the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the House
Committee on Education and Labor favorably reported COSHRA. See S. REP.
No. 453, supra note 30, at 8, 10; H.R. REP. No. 663, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1992). The same sponsors reintroduced the legislation at the beginning of the
103rd Congress. See 139 CONG. REC. S2805-20 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993)
(introduction of S. 575); 139 CONG. REC. H1163 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993)
(introduction of H.R. 1280). The House Education and Labor Committee
favorably reported H.R. 1280 on March 10, 1994. H.R. REP. No. 825, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1994). The 103rd Congress adjourned without further ac-
tion on the legislation in either body.
3
" See infra part II.C.2.
" See infra parts II.C.3-4.
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SHCs can be adapted to a wide range of workplaces and that
they reduce workplace fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. SHCs
also improve labor-management relations by allowing workers
and management to work together toward a mutual goal and by
offering a more cooperative alternative to OSHA inspections and
enforcement.
Claims that COSHRA's SHCs would run afoul of Section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act3 as employer-domi-
nated employee representation committees are unfounded. The
proposed SHCs are fully consistent with the NLRB's recent
interpretations of Section 8(a)(2). COSHRA's statutory scheme
sets forth specific requirements for the SHC's purpose, struc-
ture, composition, and functions. By providing for joint determi-
nation of the SHC's agenda, COSHRA protects SHCs from
employer domination or interference. This article ultimately
concludes that COSHRA's proposed SHC requirement repre-
sents a valuable new weapon in the fight for safer workplaces.
As a tool of public policy, SHCs are both safe, since they reduce
workplace injuries, illnesses, and fatalities, and sound, since
they foster employee involvement and improved labor-manage-
ment relations.
II. THE CASE FOR SHCs AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH
A. THE NEED FOR NEW DIRECTIONS
The OSH Act's promise of a safe and healthy workplace for
all Americans must be viewed in light of practical realities.
Although no level of corporate resources and government en-
forcement will eliminate all work-related fatalities, injuries, and
illnesses, the majority of them can be prevented simply by using
existing practices and technology.39 As U.S. Secretary of Labor
Robert B. Reich testified to Congress, "OSHA's experience of
more than two decades has shown us that most workplace
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
3 See, e.g., Susan P. Baker et al., Position Paper, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health and Center for Disease Control Panel on
Occupational Injury Prevention (1991) ("Most occupational incidents that
result in injury to the worker are avoidable and could be prevented if known
strategies were implemented widely."), reprinted in 1991 Senate Hearings,
supra note 34, at 337-38.
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injuries and illnesses are not unavoidable accidents. They are
predictable and preventable."4
Many countries are doing a much better job of ensuring safe
workplaces for their citizens. The U.S. occupational fatality rate
has declined significantly since 1970,41 but it remains six times
that of the United Kingdom, over four times that of Japan,
three times those of Denmark and Norway, more than twice
those of Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland, and significantly
higher than those of Canada, France, Germany, Poland, Austria,
and New Zealand.'2 The experiences of these nations suggest
that American employers could vastly improve conditions for
their workers.
However, federal policymakers could better fulfil OSHA's
promise. Although a strong OSHA enforcement program cer-
tainly plays a role," OSHA cannot do the job alone. OSHA
has neither the staffing nor the statutory authority to make a
substantially greater contribution to the reduction of workplace
safety and health hazards. In fact, the agency faces increasing
difficulty in maintaining its existing enforcement program. For
example, during the 1980s, while U.S. employment rose from
seventy-six million to ninety-four million, OSHA staffing was
cut approximately twenty percent to 2,400 staff members.4
Today, OSHA has only 890 front-line inspectors responsible for
3.7 million establishments, while the states have 1,200 inspec-
" The Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act:
Hearing on S. 575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1994) (testimony of Robert B. Reich); see also
Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on S.
575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (July 14, 1993) (testimony of Dr. J. Donald Millar).
41 The National Safety Council estimates that occupational fatalities
declined from 14,300 in 1969, the year before the OSH Act was enacted, to
8,500 in 1992, representing a decline in the occupational fatality rate from 18
to 7 fatalities per 100,000 workers. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note
30, at 37.
Id. at 41 (1993) (basing comparison on NSC's estimated U.S. rate).
Studies show "a measurable injury reduction" in workplaces following an
OSHA inspection. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEPVT OF
LABOR, A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH REFORM ACT (H.R. 1280) 21 (1994).
44 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ADmIN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
SAVING LIVES, PREVENTING INJURIES, PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF AMERICAN
WORKERS (1994).
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tors covering an additional 2.5 million establishments.4 As
one commentator observed,
Compliance with the [OSH Act] can not be achieved by
government inspection ofworkplaces.... OSHA targets
inspections for industries which have the highest [inju-
ry] rates. As a result, 83% of the inspections are in
construction and manufacturing. Even in these target
industries, inspections are only every five or six years.
Workplaces in other industries are almost never in-
spected unless an employee files a formal complaint.'
In the foreseeable future, OSHA will face continued dwindling
resources and a growing list of covered establishments and
protected employees. Given these limitations, federal
policymakers have begun to look elsewhere for new ways to save
lives.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
Many in the occupational safety and health community
believe that employee involvement offers the best hope for
progress. As Secretary Reich stated, "[ilt is inconceivable that
major improvement in workplace health and safety can occur
without the active involvement of workers."'47 Employee in-
volvement complements government enforcement efforts by
offering a means of identifying and correcting workplace haz-
ards through localized, worksite-based efforts. As one commen-
tator concluded, "[m]aintenance of safe and healthful workplaces
requires that the main burden of identifying violations and
making the initial efforts to obtain compliance must come from
within the workplace, not from government inspections from
outside the workplace."'  The U.S. General Accounting Office
suggested SHCs as a vehicle for such initial efforts, stating that
45 Id.
41 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 319-20 (statement of Prof. Clyde
W. Summers, University of Pennsylvania).
4' The Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act:
Hearings on S. 575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Robert B. Reich).
41 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 320 (statement of Prof. Clyde W.
Summers).
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"U]oint labor-management safety and health committees could
encourage local problem-solving and prevention activities, thus
decreasing the reliance on OSHA's limited inspection force alone
to seek out and order abatement of all worksite hazards.1
49
Similarly, Vermont state officials endorsing COSHRA
observed that "[s]afety and health committees will expand
limited OSHA and State Plan resources by empowering people
in the workplace with the authority to identify and correct
workplace hazards and prevent injuries through a cooperative
rather than adversarial process."5 °  In Washington, where
SHCs have been required for decades, officials report that SHCs
simplify enforcement. By examining SHC meeting minutes and
talking with SHC members, an inspector quickly can learn
much about the worksite and the employer's commitment to
safety and health.5'
Employee involvement also allows employers to tap into
workers' expertise. As one workers' advocate explained to
Congress, "workers themselves are the true experts about what
goes on in their workplaces. They know their workplace, and
their work, like no one else.... Workers have time and time
again been the first ones to recognize the symptoms of occupa-
tional disease often before doctors, scientists, employers or the
government."52
49 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-90-66BR, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE
WORKPLACE 49 (1990).
5 Memorandum from Barbara G. Ripley, Commissioner, Vermont De-
partment of Labor and Industry, to Kathleen Hoyt, Chief of Staff for Governor
Howard Dean (Dec. 15, 1993) (on file with author). Similarly, the Director of
Washington's Department of Labor and Industries has concluded that "[tlhe
only alternative to the use of [safety and health] plans and committees is a
large increase in the resources devoted to compliance - an increase that is
probably beyond political and fiscal feasibility." 2 1991-92 House Hearings,
supra note 30, at 226 (testimony of Joseph Dear).
5 1 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 49.
52 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 12 (statement of Nancy Lessin,
Director, Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and Health); see
also Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on
H.R. 1280 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards, Occupational Health and
Safety of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at
178 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings] (testimony of Dr.
Ian A. Greaves, Minnesota Education Resource Center, University of Minneso-
ta School of Public Health, on behalf of the Association of University Programs
in Occupational Safety and Health) ("Appropriately trained employees,
1994]
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Federal policymakers recognize the value of employee
participation in addressing workplace safety and health issues.
In 1989, for example, OSHA concluded that "employee involve-
ment in decisions affecting their safety and health results in
better management decisions and more effective protection."53
In fact, applicants to OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program,
established to recognize worksites with exemplary safety and
health practices, must include employee participation in their
safety and health programs.' Similarly, in 1991 Congress
directed OSHA to promulgate a standard regulating petrochemi-
cal plant safety, and to include a provision for employee partici-
pation."
Employers also recognize the importance of employee
involvement in the effectiveness of safety and health pro-
grams. 6 The American Bakers Association, for example, ac-
through their experience, may recognize existing and potential hazards arising
out of current work methods or planned changes in these methods, and may
have unique insights on ways to address such hazards.").
54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3907 (1989) (OSHA Safety and Health Program
Management Guidelines) (emphasis omitted).
50 Fed. Reg. 43,804,43,806,43,814 (1985) ("[Tlhe two most critical ingre-
dients common to all VPP participants are... management commit-
ment.. . and active employee involvement.). Id. at 40,806. Notably, OSHA
reports that VPP participants experience injury rates 67% to 80% lower than
industry averages. 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3910 (1989).
' Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 304(b)(3), 104 Stat.
2399, 2577 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655 (Supp. V 1993)). In response to
this directive, OSHA required employers to consult with employees regarding
the required safety programs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(c) (1994).
" See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 318-19 (statement of
Horace A. Thompson on behalf of National Association of Manufacturers)
("Employee participation programs, in their many forms, have been shown to
be effective in a broad range of situations. NAM is generally supportive of the
objectives set forth in COSHRA regarding... employee participation... so
long as the requirements are stated in broad performance-based terms); id. at
381 (statement of National Association of Home Builders) (recognizing that
"without meaningful employee input, an effective safety and health program
is impossible to achieve"); id. at 294 (statement of Gerard F. Scannell, Vice-
President for Corporate Safety Affairs, Johnson & Johnson) (recognizing that
an effective safety and health program "is not possible" without employee
participation); id. at 188 (statement of General Electric Company) (recognizing
that "[e]mployee participation can promote effective safety and health pro-
grams"); id. at 346 (statement of American Bakers Association) (recognizing
that "cooperative efforts between management and [workers] in the safety
area can enhance adherence to newly devised safety rules or programs, and
strongly influence a facility's attitude toward safety compliance efforts"); id. at
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knowledges that "the views and input of employees who work in
a given job, process or area can, in many. instances, provide
valuable information regarding safety and health concerns that
rivals that of the highest-priced, most expert consultant. 57
A 1993 survey conducted for Industrial Safety and Hygiene
News asked 1,662 corporate safety and health officials to state
their top goals for 1994.58 Seventy-two percent of the respon-
dents sought to "increase employee involvement in safety.5 9
Surprisingly, that response ranked above "keep up with OSHA,
EPA and State regulations."60
In sum, employee participation is universally regarded as
an essential element of a successful corporate safety and health
strategy. Employee participation promises obvious benefits for
workers, and yields substantial benefits for employers, because
"effective management of safety and health protection improves
employee morale and productivity, as well as significantly
reducing workers' compensation costs and other less obvious
costs of work-related injuries and illnesses."61
C. THE WIDESPREAD USE OF SHCs
Today, SHCs represent the most prevalent form of employee
involvement in workplace safety and health matters. Many of
our principal foreign competitor nations require some or all
employers to establish such committees. In the United States,
twelve states already require some or all employers to establish
SHCs. Many additional U.S. employers participate in SHCs
pursuant to the terms of collective bargaining agreements.
Finally, many U.S. employers have established SHCs voluntari-
ly. Together, these SHCs provide a broad base of experience
from which to assess their effectiveness.
354 (testimony of American Industrial Hygiene Assn.) (organization "strongly
supports the concept of employee participation"); 1993 House Subcommittee Hear-
ings, supra note 52, at 509 (Statement of Weyerhaeuser Company) ("We
support the concept of employee participation in safety and health commit-
tees.").
5' 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 346.
5 See CHILTON RESEARCH SERvIcEs, 1994 WHrrE PAPER SURVEY (1993).
59 Id. at tbl. 4.
' Id. (latter response given by 71% of respondents).
61 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3908 (1989) (OSHA Safety and Health Program
Management Guidelines).
1994]
78 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:65
1. Other Countries
Many industrialized countries require SHCs for some or all
employers. These nations include Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Ireland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
62
Canada provides a useful comparison to the United States
based on its geographic proximity and similar economic and
industrial practices. Each of Canada's provinces and territories,
and its federal government, require at least some employers to
have SHCs.6' For example, since the 1970s, British Columbia,
New Brunswick, the Northwest Territory, Saskatchewan, and
the Yukon Territory have all required employers with a mini-
mum number of employees (ranging between ten and fifty work-
ers) to establish SHCs.64
In many Canadian jurisdictions, SHCs are empowered to
receive complaints, conduct inspections, inspect records, and
make recommendations to the employer.65 Most Canadian
jurisdictions require worker representatives to comprise at least
half of the SHC, provide for committee meetings at least three
or four times each year, and require employers to pay committee
members for time spent on SHC activities.6"
2. U.S. State Laws
Twelve states require SHCs pursuant to their occupational
safety and health or workers' compensation laws. Washington,
for example, has required joint safety and health committees for
employers with eleven or more employees since 1945,67 and
2 2 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 277-79 (attachment 5 to
testimony of Lynn Williams, Chair, Standing Committee on Safety and
Occupational Health, AFL-CIO); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 49, at 48.
63 See PAUL M FORDER & ROBERT D. MCMURDO, WORKPLACE HEALTH &
SAFETY AGENCY, WORKING TOGETHER ON HEALTH AND SAFETY: THE IMPACT
OF JOINT HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEES ON HEALTH AND SAFETY TRENDS
IN ONTARIO, CANADA 5 (1994).
' See id.
65 Id. at 8.
6Id. at 9.
67 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-24-020 (1992); 1991 Senate Hearings, supra
note 34, at 222 (testimony of Joseph A. Dear, Director, Washington State
Department of Labor and Industries).
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has allowed employees to elect their own representatives since
1973.68 Oregon enacted legislation requiring safety and health
committees in 1973. As amended in 1990, the law applies to
employers with eleven or more employees, and to smaller
employers with high workers' compensation premium rates or
high lost workday injury rates.69 Meanwhile, Alaska targets
its SHC requirement to its most dangerous workplaces. The
requirement covers the state's pulp, paper and paperboard
industries."
Many states have enacted SHC requirements in recent
years. In 1992, three states amended their workers' compensa-
tion laws to require SHCs. In response to the Imperial Food
disaster, North Carolina established a SHC requirement for
employers with eleven or more employees and a high workers'
compensation experience rating. 1 Minnesota now requires
SHCs for employers with more than twenty-five employees and
for smaller employers with lost workday rates in the top ten
percent. 2 Tennessee's SHC requirement applies to employers
with the highest injury rates. 3
Six more states enacted SHC requirements in 1993.
Nebraska's new SHC provision applies to all employers subject
to its workers' compensation law. 4 West Virginia amended its
68 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-24-045(1) (1992).
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 654.176 (1991); 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note
30, at 249, 258 (testimony of John A. Pompei, Administrator, Oregon Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Division, Department of Insurance and Finance).
The Oregon law grants SHC members the right to receive training, hold
meetings, keep records, review the employer's records, conduct inspections,
and make recommendations. OR. REV. STAT. § 654.182.
70 ALAsKA ADMN. CODE tit. 8, § 61.010.07.310(a)(8) (1994).
7 1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-252 (1993). The North Carolina law grants SHCs
the right to review safety and health programs, conduct inspections, and
investigate work-related accidents. Id.
72 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.231 (West 1993); Further Perspectives on OSHA
Reform: Hearings on S. 575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 22, 1994) (statement of John B. Lennes,
Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Labor).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-501(a) (Supp. 1994).
74 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-443 (Supp. 1993). The Nebraska law provides for
an equal number of management and worker representatives in non-union
settings; in unionized shops, committees are to be established through collec-
tive bargaining. Employers must compensate SHC members for time spent on
committee activities. Id.
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workers' compensation law to authorize the state workers'
compensation commissioner to require SHCs in workplaces with
a high workers' compensation experience rating.7" Montana
established a SHC requirement for all employers with more
than five employees7"; Nevada requires SHCs for employers
with more than twenty-five employees."
As part of its workers' compensation reform effort, Florida
enacted legislation requiring SHCs for employers with more
than ten employees and for smaller employers with a high
"frequency or severity of work-related injuries."78  Similarly,
Connecticut amended its workers' compensation law to impose
a SHC requirement on employers with twenty-five or more
employees and smaller employers with higher than average
injury and illness rates.7s Although California has no SHC
requirement, the state requires employers with ten or more
employees to establish "a system for communicating with
employees" on safety and health issues."0 Employers who
establish a SHC in compliance with certain statutory criteria
"shall be presumed to be in substantial compliance" with the
statutory employee communication requirement."1
3. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Safety and health committees probably originated through
the collective bargaining process. According to the AFL-CIO,
SHCs date back to at least 1914, when the United Mine Work-
ers negotiated contracts in Washington State requiring one such
committee at each mine. 2 Today, approximately half of all
75 W. VA. CODE § 23-2B-2 (1994). The commissioner may promulgate
regulations regarding committee membership, meetings, record-keeping,
compensation of members, and committee functions (including inspections,
investigations, and safety and health program evaluations). Id.
76 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1504 to 1505 (Supp. 1993).
77 NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 618.383(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993).
78 Act of Nov. 24, 1993, 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 93-415.
71 Worker's Compensation Act § 28(a), 1993 Conn. Acts 228, Pub. Act No.
93-228. The law requires the state workers' compensation commissioner to
issue regulations regarding committee membership, committee meetings,
inspections, investigations, recordkeeping, compensation for time spent on
committee activities, and training. Id.
80 CAL. LAB. CODE § 6401.7(a)(5) (West Supp. 1994).
8 1Id. at § 6401.7(f(2).
82 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 46 (statement of Thomas R.
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collective bargaining agreements provide for the establishment
of SHCs. 3 For example, Ford Motor Co. and the UAW main-
tain SHCs at all major Ford facilities.84
4. Individual Employers
Thousands of U.S. employers have established SHCs,8
5
even where SHCs are not required by state law or by the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. The National Safety
Council's 1993 study of SHCs found that seventy-five percent of
firms with fifty or more employees had set up SHCs, while
thirty-one percent of the firms with fewer than fifty employees
had set up SHCs. 5
Many U.S. employers have established SHCs, from small
businesses to large companies such as Hewlett-Packard and
Monsanto."7 SHCs are particularly prevalent in manufactur-
Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO).
' See id. (citing 1986 Bureau of National Affairs finding that SHCs exist
in 49% of collective bargaining agreements); see also id. at 171 (testimony of
Michael J. Wright, Director, Health, Safety and Environment Department,
United Steelworkers of America) (noting that most worksites represented by
United Steelworkers maintain safety and health committees).
" Id. at 200 (testimony of Anthony Ruggiero, Union Relations Coordinator,
Ford Motor Company, North American Automotive Operations) (including
committees comprised of one safety engineer and one UAW full-time represen-
tative implementing management directives).
"I RUTH RuTTENBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE ROLE OF LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT COMMITTEES IN SAFEGUARDING WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH i
(1990).
86 THoMAs W. PLANEK & KENNETH P. KOLOSH, NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
SuRvEY OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN SAFETY AND HEALTH 6 (1993)
(analyzing 249 responses to national sample of 2,500 firms), reprinted in 1993
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 39.
' See 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 314 (testimony of
Walter G. Rostykus, Environmental Health and Safety Specialist, Hewlett-
Packard Company) ("[HP] requires that each plant maintain safety committees
or similar organizations of employee involvement."); 1992 Senate Hearings,
supra note 33, at 290 (testimony of Thomas Evans, Director of Safety and
Environmental Health, Monsanto Chemical Company, on behalf of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association) ("Monsanto has safety and health
committees in virtually every plant."); see also id. at 284-85 (testimony of
Peter Cornelison, President, Condar Company, on behalf of the National
Federation of Independent Business) (small business owners' safety committee
conducts monthly inspections of businesses); id. at 290 (testimony of William
Steinmetz, Jr., Loss Control Manager, Midland Engineering Co., on behalf of
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ing industries such as the steel, electronics, and automobile
industries."5 Additionally, a vast majority of plants in the
petrochemical industry have established SHCs. 9
D. THE PROVEN EFFECTIVENESS OF SHCs
Through the widespread use of SHCs, the occupational
safety and health community has learned much about their
effectiveness. As one Washington state employer observed,
"[t]he safety committee is one of [the] cornerstones of a healthful
and prosperous workplace." 0
SHCs have improved workplace safety and health for a
number of reasons: First, as the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment has recognized, SHCs represent "an avenue for
sharing and conveying information about hazards and con-
trols."91 Through regular inspections, meetings, and advisory
recommendations, SHCs ensure a continuous opportunity for
workplace safety and health risks to be identified and corrected.9
2
the National Roofing Contractors Association); id. at 346 (statement of
American Bakers Association) ("Many ABA-member companies have a range
of labor-management safety committees or other mechanisms in place in some
of their unionized facilities."); id. at 196 (statement of American Gas Associ-
ation).
' See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 358 (statement of
American Iron and Steel Institute) ("Safety and health committees already
exist at major steelmaking facilities."); id. at 377 (statement of Electronic
Industries Association) ("[Mlany of our members maintain their own health
and safety committees consisting of employees from all levels of their orga-
nizations."); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89 JoHN GRAY INST., LAMAR UNIV. SYS., MANAGING WORKPLACE SAFETY
AND HEALTH: THE CASE OF CONTRACT LABOR IN THE U.S. PETROCHEMICAL
INDUsTRY 133 (1991) (reporting SHCs in facilities of 84% of plant managers
surveyed). The report was produced under a grant from the U.S. Department
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
90 Letter from Cynde Harris, Risk Manager, Keith Uddenberg, Inc., to Greg
Watchman (Nov. 1, 1994) (on file with author).
9' OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 30, at 22; see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 49 ("Opening lines of communica-
tion may increase participation in safety and health, providing both an
opportunity for an employer to use its expertise as well as increasing the role
of workers in overseeing their own day-to-day safety practices.").
92 See, e.g., Meeting of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations, U.S. Department of Labor 80 (July 28, 1993) [hereinafter
Department ofLabor Commission Meeting] (testimony of Lisa Trussell, Human
Resource Manager, Norpac Foods) ("[M]ost employers find [that] the safety
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Second, SHCs foster a more cooperative relationship be-
tween workers and managers on safety and health issues.9
While many workplace issues are seen as a "zero sum" game,
both labor and management can work together towards the
singular goal of making a safer workplace. Moreover, SHCs
provide an effective alternative to the more adversarial process-
es provided for under the current OSH Act. Instead of filing a
complaint with OSHA, prompting an investigation and possibly
leading to citations, monetary penalties, and enforcement
actions, workers can discuss safety and health problems with
their SHC representatives. 9' After Oregon established a statu-
tory SHC requirement in 1990, the state OSHA administrator
found that "with the inception of the safety and health commit-
tees,.., workers and companies are tending to work more
together, thus filing [fewer] complaints."95
Third, SHCs often permit faster abatement of hazards. As
the U.S. General Accounting Office explained,
Reporting hazardous work conditions to an on-site
[SHC] could more fully and immediately take advan-
tage of worker knowledge than would reporting the
hazard to OSHA and waiting for an inspection to be
done if OSHA thinks a problem exists. If the employer
does not abate the hazard, the worker would still have
the option of requesting an inspection from OSHA.9"
committees have heightened awareness on safety and provided an opportunity
to sit down and communicate regularly with their workforce.").
9sSee, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 205 (testimony of
Anthony Ruggiero, Union Relations Coordinator, North American Automotive
Operations, Ford Motor Company) ("The establishment of joint committees
within Ford facilities has promoted a spirit of teamwork... that improves
working conditions for all employees.... In a work atmosphere where there
has traditionally been an adversarial working relationship, joint health and
safety committees have helped reduce conflict by demonstrating that our objec-
tives are the same - an accident-free working environment").
94 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 49 (submitting
complaints to a SHC "would be a less adversarial action than requesting an
OSHA inspection").
95 Department of Labor Commission Meeting, supra note 92, at 77 (testi-
mony of John A. Pompei, Administrator, Oregon Occupational Safety and
Health Division, Department of Insurance and Finance).
96 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 49.
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States requiring SHCs have found that "[r]eporting hazardous
work conditions to an on-site safety and health committee may
get quicker correction than reporting the hazards to OSHA."9
For example, a United Auto Workers representative described a
typical problem-solving exercise at a Michigan foam-producing
plant: "[Oin a routine walkaround, [SHC members] discovered
a new recovery system that was releasing dangerous solvents
into the work air. The committee jumped on the case and
recommended that management get ventilation for it before it
would injure anyone."'  The problem was thus addressed
much faster than if a worker had lodged a formal complaint
with OSHA.
Fourth, where a SHC exists, employees are more likely to
report hazards, and to have less fear of reprisal for doing so."
Although in organized workplaces the union often provides an
adequate avenue for workers to raise safety and health con-
cerns, roughly eighty-nine percent of private sector workers in
this country lack union representation.' ° A consensus has
emerged, recognizing SHCs as the best means of providing
meaningful employee involvement in workplace safety and
health issues, and SHCs have achieved widespread support
throughout all segments of the occupational safety and health
community.
In its 1993 study of SHCs, the National Safety Council
found "general agreement" between business and labor repre-
sentatives "that [SHCs] have been at least moderately success-
ful" in improving worksite safety.'0 ' More specifically, ninety-
" 1991 Senate hearings, supra note 34, at 196 (statement of U.S. General
Accounting Office).
98 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 168 (statement of Al
Przydzial, Chairperson, UAW Local 985).
" See, e.g., id. at 240 (statement of Prof. Thomas A. Kochan, M.I.T. Sloan
School of Management) (describing study of safety and health committees in
the petrochemical industry).
100 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT-FINDING REPORT 24 (1994) (referring to private sector,
non-agricultural workers); see 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
52, at 243 (testimony of Jim Moran, Director, Philadelphia Area Project on
Occupational Safety and Health) ("Fear of retaliation is heavy among workers
especially in bad economic times, when jobs that pay decent wages are nearly
extinct.").
101 PLANEK & KOLOSH, supra note 86, at ii, reprinted in 1993 House Sub-
committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 32.
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four percent of the employers responding to the survey believed
that SHCs had been greatly or moderately successful in improv-
ing worksite safety." 2 In addition, overwhelming majorities
of the survey respondents (representatives of both management
and labor) agreed that a SHC is essential for a successful safety
and health program, and that it improves employee morale,
leads workers to take more responsibility for their own safety,
and improves trust between workers and management. 10
3
In a 1993 survey of corporate safety and health officials for
Industrial Safety and Hygiene News, thirty percent of the 1,662
respondents agreed that Congress should "pass a law requiring
employers to have labor-management safety committees."'1°
The American Center for the Quality of Work Life also found
that SHCs contribute to increased visibility of safety and health
issues among both managers and rank-and-file employees. 05
According to the United Steelworkers of America, "the single
most reliable predictor of the safety of a plant ... is the
strength and commitment of the [SHC].' 06
Substantial anecdotal and systemic evidence attests to the
effectiveness of SHCs. In a 1994 report, Canada's Workplace
Health and Safety Agency assessed the impact of SHCs on
safety and health in Ontario workplaces by undertaking three
different inquiries. The Agency surveyed three major studies of
SHCs in Ontario and concluded that "uin the aggregate, these
studies provide evidence that effective [SHCs] are associated
with better [safety and health] performance and practice."'0 7
The Agency then analyzed fatality, accident, and lost workday
1 2 Id. at 13, reprinted in 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
52 at 46.
103 Id. at 21, 23, reprinted in 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 52 at 54, 56.
1'4 CHILTON RESEARCH SERVICES, supra note 58.
10 5 AMERiCAN CTR. FOR THE QUALITY OF WORK LIFE, A FEW HIGHLIGHTS
FROM THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR THE QUALITY OF
WORK LIFE IN APRIL 1984, cited in RUTrENBERG, supra note 85, at 43.
10" 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 171 (testimony of Michael J.
Wright, Director, Health and Safety Environment Department, United
Steelworkers of America).
107 See FoRDER & MCMURDO, supra note 63, at iii. In a 1991 poll, 78% of
respondent employers reported that SHCs make an important contribution to
safety and health in the workplace. 7 OH&S CANADA No.4 July/Aug. 1991,
cited in 2 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 518-19.
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rates between 1972 and 1989, and found its results to be "con-
sistent with the hypothesis that the implementation of the
OHSA [which includes a SHC requirement] has contributed to
a reduction of injury rates in Ontario.' ' 08 Finally, the Agency
cited four case studies in which employers took measures to
improve their SHCs and subsequently observed decreases in
accident rates, lost time injury rates, and workers' compensation
costs.10 9
SHCs have also achieved success at U.S. worksites. While
most state SHC requirements are too new to have demonstrated
success, Washington and Oregon have had positive experiences
with their SHC provisions. For example, according to the head
of Oregon's occupational safety and health agency, "[t]he estab-
lishment of the committees has raised the level of consciousness
for the field of occupational safety and health throughout the
state and has had a very positive effect on the work climate in
Oregon.""'  A representative of Oregon industry agreed, re-
porting that "the creation of a program involving mandatory
safety committees is a vital ingredient of loss prevention.""'
More specifically, Oregon has reported a substantial decline
in fatality and incidence rates after the SHC requirement was
enacted along with other OSHA reforms." 2 The decline was
accompanied by an estimated $1.5 billion in savings to Oregon
employers, in direct and indirect costs of work-related accidents
and illnesses."' These savings prompted one Oregon employ-
er to describe the state's new SHC requirement as a "smashing
success."
114
108 FORDER & MCMURDO, supra note 63, at 27.
'
09 Id. at 29.
110 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, 117, at 250 (testimony of
John A. Pompei, Administrator, Oregon Occupational Safety and Health
Division, Department of Insurance and Finance).
. Letter from Karl Frederick, Vice President and Director of Legislation,
Associated Oregon Industries, to Bill Lockyer, California State Senator (July
6, 1993) (on file with author).
112 Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on
S. 575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 14, 1993) (testimony of John A. Pompei).
113 Id.
.
4 Businesses Fall in Love With Workplace Safety Teams, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 16, 1994, at B2.
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After the creation of an effective SHC, many employers
have experienced declines in injury, illness, and fatality rates,
as the following accounts demonstrate:
The president of a Seattle construction firm testified that
"our [SHCs] have played a significant role in the identifica-
tion and elimination of hazards on our job sites and in the
dramatic reduction in our accident rate."
115
" The Xerox Corporation established a joint committee at one
of its facilities to review injury records, conduct regular in-
spections, and meet on a quarterly basis. Workers reported
a forty percent decrease in injury rates over a five-year
period."'
" A United Auto Workers representative reported that the
joint safety and health committee at Mallinckrodt Chemical
Company in St. Louis increased workers' awareness of
OSHA standards and management's awareness of its role in
ensuring health and safety, resulting in more effective
procedures for confined spaces, lockouts, and employee
training.117
" The Hewlett-Packard Company found that a SHC "strongly
influences safe behavior in the workplace.""1
18
" In the 1980s, Occidental Chemical Corporation instituted
safety committees as well as other employee involvement
mechanisms, and subsequently experienced "a dramatically
decreased cost for accidents."" 9
115 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, 117, at 278 (testimony of
Christopher L. Clark, President, W.G. Clark Construction Co.).
116 Letter from Anthony J. Costania, Manager, Rochester Joint Board,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, to Jack Sheinkman,
President, ACTWU (May 15, 1992), reprinted in 1992 Senate Hearings, supra
note 33, at 305-06.
1" 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, 117, at 160-61 (testimony of
John Johnson, Vice President, UAW Local 1887).
" Id. at 317 (testimony of Walter G. Rostykus, Environmental Health and
Safety Specialist, Hewlett-Packard Company).
" S.L. Smith, Occidental Chemical: Making Changes for the Better,
OCCUPATIONAL HAzARDS, 65, 65-66 (May 1992).
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" An Oregon manufacturer of industrial equipment reported
that its SHC heightened awareness of safety issues, im-
proved communications between labor and management,
and reduced accidents.
120
" The Armco Steel Company established a SHC in its Kansas
City, Missouri facility in 1988; the plant's recordable acci-
dent rate fell almost fifty percent over the ensuing two
years, and the company saved nearly $1.5 million as a
result.
121
SHCs have proven particularly successful in the petrochem-
ical industry, according to a 1991 report by the John Gray
Institute.122 A substantial majority of plants have SHCs, and
the Institute found that "the more frequently committees met
the lower the ... injury rates in the plant.' 123  Similarly,
eighty percent of workers in such plants rated their SHC's work
as "excellent" or "good.' 24 The Institute concluded that SHCs
"offer an excellent potential vehicle for contributing to continual
monitoring and improvement of safety," and recommended that
OSHA require an effective SHC at each petrochemical
plant.12
5
Based on the proven track record of SHCs in U.S.
workplaces, the Clinton Administration has endorsed COSHRA's
SHC requirement. As Secretary of Labor Reich wrote:
[COSHRA] introduces new ways to "reinvent" regula-
tion of workplace health and safety through compre-
hensive health and safety programs and joint safety
and health committees. Empowering workers to partic-
ipate in safety and health activities and encouraging
employees and management to cooperate to improve
the places in which they work will save lives and tax
121 Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on S. 575 Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, supra note 112 (testimony
of John A. Pompei).
121 See H.R. REP. No. 825, supra note 35, at 50.
122 See generally JOHN GRAY INST., supra note 89.
123 Id. at 189.
1? Id. at 136.
125 Id. at 189, 202-03.
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dollars, and will make government regulation less
burdensome.
2 6
E. OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY SHCs
Most employers agree that SHCs effectively foster labor-
management cooperation and reduce workplace injuries and
illnesses. 7 Nevertheless, many of these same employers
oppose the enactment of a statutory SHC requirement. Ironical-
ly, these critics have expressed opposition to COSHRA's pro-
posed SHC requirement even while acknowledging their own
use of SHCs.'" For example, the National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business opposed COSHRA's SHC requirement while
acknowledging that it "tries to duplicate policies many small
employers have already implemented.' 9 Indeed, many even
recognized the effectiveness of their own SHCs while simulta-
'Letter from Robert B. Reich, U.S. Secretary of Labor, to Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (Dec. 22, 1993) (on file with author).
See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 290 (testimony of
Thomas Evans, Director of Safety and Environmental Health, Monsanto
Chemical Company, on behalf of Chemical Manufacturers Association) (oppos-
ing COSHRA's SHC requirement although "Monsanto has [SHCs] in virtually
every plant"); id. at 284-85 (testimony of Peter Cornelison, President, Condar
Company, on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business)
(small business owner opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement although his
business has a SHC); id. at 290 (testimony of William Steinmetz, Jr., Loss
Control Manager, Midland Engineering Company, on behalf of the National
Roofing Contractors Association) (opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement
although company has a SHC); id. at 358 (statement of American Iron and
Steel Institute) (opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement although SHCs
"already exist at major steelmaking facilities"); id. at 346 (statement of
American Bakers Association) (opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement al-
though "mlany ABA-member companies have a range of labor-management
safety committees or other mechanisms in place in some of their unionized
facilities"); 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 341, 344 (statement
of Chemical Manufacturers Association) (opposing Congressional mandate
although many employers rely on SHCs); 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note
33, at 377 (statement of Electronic Industries Association) (opposing
COSHRA's SHC requirement although "many of our members maintain their
own [SHCs] consisting of employees from all levels of their organizations"); id.
at 196 (statement of American Gas Association) (opposing COSHRAI's SHC
requirement although some members already have SHCs).
Further Perspectives on OSHA Reform: Hearings on S. 575 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (March
22, 1994) (statement of the National Federation of Independent Business).
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neously opposing the OSHA reform legislation.' Others
strongly supported the concept of employee participation, while
opposing COSHRA's specific requirements.''
1"0 See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 360 (statement of the
American Paper Institute) ("While most companies in our industry have had
positive experiences with committees, they should not be mandated."); id. at
377 (statement of Electronic Industries Association) (admitting that "voluntary
efforts [involving committees] have contributed to safer and healthier
workplaces," but opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement); id. at 326 (statement
of American Petroleum Institute) ("API members have found value in the
voluntary [SHCs] prevalent in the industry .... However, API is opposed to
legislative requirements that would mandate [SHCs]."); id. at 366 (statement
of Amoco Corporation) (acknowledging that "[slome [Amoco] facilities have
successfully utilized voluntary joint labor-management committees," but
opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement); 11991-92 House Hearings, supra note
30, at 300-02 (statement of John M. Baitsell, Mobil Corporation and Chair-
man, Employment Policy Foundation) (opposing mandatory SHCs while ac-
knowledging success of SHCs at Mobil); see also 1991 Senate Hearings, supra
note 34, at 78 (statement of Morton Corn, former Assistant Secretary for
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor) (maintaining that
although SHCs are "essential," Congress should not mandate them).
131 See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 318-19 (statement of
Horace A. Thompson, on behalf of National Association of Manufacturers)
("NAM is generally supportive of the objectives set forth in COSHRA regard-
ing... employee participation... so long as the requirements are stated in
broad, performance-based terms .... Employee participation programs, in
their many forms, have been shown to be effective in a broad range of situa-
tions, including safety and health, [on a voluntary basis]. NAM, however,
opposes the requirements of COSHRA that would mandate labor-management
committees."); id. at 381 (statement of National Association of Home Builders)
(recognizing that "without meaningful employee input, an effective safety and
health program is impossible to achieve," but opposing COSHRA's committee
requirement); id. at 294 (statement of Gerard F. Scannell, Vice-President for
Corporate Safety Affairs, Johnson & Johnson) (recognizing that an effective
safety and health program "is not possible" without employee participation,
but opposing COSHRA's committee requirement); id. at 188 (statement of
General Electric Company) (recognizing that "[e]mployee participation can
promote effective safety and health programs" but opposing COSHRA's
committee requirement); id. at 346 (statement of American Bakers Associa-
tion) (recognizing that "cooperative efforts between management and [workers]
in the safety area can enhance adherence to newly devised safety rules or
programs, and strongly influence a facility's attitude toward safety compliance
efforts," but opposing COSHRA's committee requirement); id. at 354 (state-
ment of the American Industrial Hygiene Association) ("strongly support[ing]
the concept of employee participation," but opposing COSHRA's committee
requirement); 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 154 (statement of Jerry
L. Williams, Director, Corporate Safety, Industrial Hygiene and Workers'
Compensation, McKee Foods, on behalf of the Independent Bakers Association)
(supporting statutory requirement of employee involvement, but seeking "flexi-
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Employer opposition to COSHRA's SHC requirement stems
from three principal arguments: First, the proposed SHCs
would be too costly; second, cooperation between workers and
management on safety and health issues cannot be mandated;
and third, employers need the flexibility to decide for them-
selves whether and how to set up SHCs at each of their
worksites.
In their first argument, many employers assert that
COSHRA's SHC requirement would impose a costly mandate on
U.S. employers at a time when they are facing increasingly stiff
economic competition from abroad. For example, the Employ-
ment Policy Foundation, a business-supported research group,
estimated that it would cost employers $11.01 billion annually
to comply with COSHRA's SHC requirement.'32 This esti-
mate, however, suffers from a number of weaknesses: first, it is
purely speculative; second, it makes no adjustment for employ-
ers that have already established SHCs; and third, it estimates
costs but makes no effort to estimate savings which would
result from lower injury, illness and fatality rates. A c t u a 1
experience provides a marked contrast to the Employment
Policy Foundation's estimate. For example, when Oregon
required employers to establish SHCs in 1991, the state's
occupational safety and health agency found that "the fiscal
impact to employers [was] negligible.'13 3
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration studied
the proposed legislation based on its twenty-three years of
enforcing the OSH Act, and reached conclusions very different
from Employment Policy Foundation's conclusions. OSHA
estimated that the legislation's SHC provision would impose
$1.2 billion in compliance costs on private sector employers,
roughly one-tenth of the Employment Policy Foundation's
estimate.3 4  Moreover, OSHA estimated that the legislation
as a whole would save employers between $12 billion and $18.3
bility" to determine exact method).
2 Further Perspectives on OSHA Reform: Hearings on S. 575 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, supra note 129 (statement of
Dr. James S. Holt, Senior Economist and Vice-President for Research, Employ-
ment Policy Foundation).
... 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, 117, at 249 (testimony of
John A. Pompei, Administrator, Oregon Occupational Safety and Health
Division, Department of Insurance and Finance).
134 OCCUpATIoNAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 43, at 7.
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billion per year in lower injury rates and reduced medical and
other associated costs. These savings, offset by total costs of
$10.7 billion, would ultimately result in an estimated net benefit
of $1.3 billion to $7.6 billion annually."5
The second employer argument asserts that mandated
SHCs cannot function as effectively as voluntarily established
SHCs. The Employment Policy Foundation, for example, testi-
fied that "mandating [SHCs] is a prescription for failure."'36
Similarly, many trade and industry associations have warned
against attempts to impose mandatory SHCs.3 7
Nevertheless, at least twelve states already have enacted
laws requiring some or all employers to establish SHCs, and
some of these laws have existed for years. 8' Despite this
substantial body of experience, the opponents of COSHRA's
SHC requirement have offered no evidence whatsoever that
SHCs mandated by state laws have been any less effective than
those established voluntarily.
Thus, the mere fact that a SHC is required by law, rather
than established voluntarily or pursuant to a collective bargain-
ing agreement, does not determine its effectiveness. In fact,
SHCs established pursuant to a legislative mandate, with
specific minimum requirements, may be more likely than
voluntarily established programs to improve workplace safety
and health. Many SHCs established on a voluntary basis are
ineffective because their goals, structure, composition, and
fumctions are poorly defined. As the U.S. Department of Labor
115 Id. at 6-7.
... 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 298 (statement of John M.
Baitsell); see also 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 469
(statement of the National Association of Home Builders) ("[Mleaningful
employee participation... cannot be mandated.").
... 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 344 (statement of American
Ambulance Association) (maintaining that SHCs "can only be successful if they
are voluntary"); 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 279
(statement of Chocolate Manufacturers Association and National Confectioners
Association) ("Forced cooperation simply does not work."); Comprehensive
Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 1280 Before the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 276 (White
Paper statement of American Iron and Steel Institute) (claiming that
COSHRA's SHC composition and operation requirements "will undermine the
spirit of cooperation that is necessary for [SHCs] to work productively... to
enhance employee safety and health.").
13 See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
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recognized in a 1990 study, "many [safety and health] commit-
tees are paper tigers." 9
Virtually every COSHRA opponent cites the third argu-
ment, that employers need "flexibility" in setting up employee
participation programs.14 While businesses no doubt need
operational flexibility in order to compete successfully, this
argument ultimately fails because COSHRA does permit signifi-
cant flexibility in the establishment of SHCs.
COSHRA's SHC requirement exempts employers with ten
or fewer employees, leaving more than three-quarters of all U.S.
firms free to establish voluntary SHCs tailored to their own
needs." It also allows the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to modify SHC requirements for unusual work
situations and worksites. 42 Further, COSHRA provides only
the minimum requirements for SHC structure, composition, and
functions, leaving considerable discretion to SHCs in the exer-
cise of those functions.' 4 Finally, COSHRA already has been
modified in the House of Representatives to allow an employer
to apply for OSHA's permission to use an alternative employee
participation program that is "at least as effective" as a
SHC.'"
Some of this "employer flexibility" opposition is premised
upon a mistaken belief that COSHRA would require employers
to discontinue any existing employee participation programs in
favor of the mandatory SHCs. 45 For example, representatives
139 RUTTENBERG, supra note 85, at 9-11.
140 See, e.g., 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 130
(testimony of Dr. Frederick Toca, Director of Occupational Safety and Health,
Hoechst Celanese Corporation, on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers
Association) (recognizing that "a workable employee participation program is
critical to a successful health and safety program," but opposing COSHRA's
SHC requirement because "[1limiting managements flexibility will not
enhance workplace health and safety"); id. at 146 (statement of Society for
Human Resource Management) (opposing COSHRA's SHC requirement
because "employers must have total flexibility in deciding how employee
participation will be most effective within their companies").
4"See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 100, at 8.
4 See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 346 (statement of
American Bakers Association) (requiring committees "will unnecessarily derail
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of the confectionery industry warned that COSHRA's SHC
requirement "could destroy existing programs that are very
successful."'46 Even some Republican members of the House
Education and Labor Committee shared the misconception that
"[COSHRA] limits employee involvement to safety commit-
tees.''147 In reality, nothing in the legislation would preclude
an employer from continuing to use alternatives such as safety
representatives, complaint procedures, or hazard-specific safety
teams. In fact, such measures could complement SHCs to
improve the effectiveness of the employer's overall safety and
health program."4  Furthermore, COSHRA's opponents have
offered no evidence that employers have had difficulty comply-
ing with existing state-mandated SHC requirements in a broad
range of work settings. In Washington state, for example, more
than ninety-five percent of inspected businesses comply with a
longstanding state law requiring SHCs at firms with eleven or
more employees. 49
Finally, thousands of U.S. employers have declined to
establish employee participation programs of any kind, although
such programs would clearly help employers fulfill their statuto-
ry obligation to provide a safe workplace to their employees.' °
They have ignored significant evidence that SHCs help to
reduce work-related injuries and illnesses as well as associated
existing, successful programs and otherwise damage productivity"); id. at 366-
67 (statement of Amoco Corporation) ("[COSHRA's] requirement for safety and
health committees with rigid rights and responsibilities will force us to
abandon our heretofore successful adaptable approach."); 1993 House Subcom-
mittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 495 (statement of Eamonn McGeady, Pres-
ident, Martin G. Imbach, Inc.) (maintaining that COSHRA's SHC requirement
"would require many well-functioning groups currently in place in many
workplace sites to be disbanded or restructured on illogical grounds").
14 1993 House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 52, at 279 (statement
of Chocolate Manufacturers Association and National Confectioners Associa-
tion).
147 H.R. REP. No. 825, supra note 35, at 257 (statement of Minority Views).
148 Where such an alternative already performs regular inspections or
carries out other activities within the scope of the SHC's functions, the SHC
would have the discretion not to exercise its right to perform such functions.
149 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 232-33 (testimony of Joseph A.
Dear, Director, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries).
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988) ("Each employer... shall furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.").
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costs. For some of these employers, perhaps "flexibility" simply
means the right to make their workers' safety and health a low
priority as a matter of corporate policy.
151
F. DESIGNING A SuccEssFuL SHC
Clearly, the structure and functions of SHCs are critical to
their effectiveness in fostering labor-management cooperation
and in reducing worksite accidents and occupational illnesses.
In a 1990 study, the Department of Labor offered its insights
into what makes a SHC successful. First, the Department ob-
served that "if these committees are to function effectively, their
mandates, the scope of their powers, and their limitations need
to be clearly established."'52  Second, according to the
Department's study, most successful SHCs share a number of
functions: they make recommendations, review safety and
health records, prevent hazards, promote education and train-
ing, make plant inspections, investigate accidents and com-
plaints, settle disputes, and shut down unsafe machinery.
Third, the Department cautioned that
A joint committee with unequal representation by man-
agement and labor, or with infrequent meetings, or
with members that have no line authority outside the
committee, or that does not provide pay for members
who do committee work during working hours is less
likely to have the capability of making contributions
151 Some employers have raised an additional concern that written recom-
mendations made by SHCs, if not carried out by the employer, could serve as
the basis for tort suits against the employer by injured workers. See, e.g.,
1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 263 (testimony of Merle T. Alvis,
Manager of Employee and Community Relations, Babcock and Wilcox, on
behalf of the Society for Human Resource Management) ("The establishment
of SHCs could ... increase employer liability and adversely affect the exclusiv-
ity of worker's compensation as a remedy for job related injuries."). Neverthe-
less, § 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act expressly provides:
[niothing in this [Act] shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, disease, or death of employees arising
out of, or in the course of, employment.
29 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
I52RUrNBERG, supra note 85, at 4.
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which will have a major effect on correcting safety and
health hazards in the workplace.' 3
Thus, the Department of Labor recommended that SHCs be set
up so that the SHC's rights would be well-defined, employees
could participate as an equal partner and select their own rep-
resentatives, and the SHC would be worksite-based to ensure a
community of interests.'
At a glance, these considerations may seem far removed
from the daily grind of the factory floor. However, they do
relate to the ultimate goal of saving lives. A pair of contrasting
examples demonstrates that in practice, these considerations
can mean the difference between life and death.
Prior to 1989, Keith Uddenberg, Inc., a grocery chain in
Washington, showed relatively little commitment to worker
safety. 5' Workers "never had much of a voice" in safety and
health issues,'56 and the company's workers' compensation
experience rating was 3.4% above the industry average.
157
In 1989, the company established new SHCs at each of its
twenty-five stores and made a strong commitment to protecting
its workers. As required by Washington State's occupational
safety and health law', each SHC's employee representatives
were elected by workers and comprised fifty percent of each
SHC. 5 9 The company encouraged each SHC to meet once a
month, conduct an inspection at least every other month, review
the company's accident records, and make recommendations to
the company regarding the correction of workplace hazards. 60
153 Id.
154 Id. at 5, 37 ("Safety committees are most likely to prove effective where
their work is related to a single establishment rather than a collection of
geographically distinct places."); see also 11991-92 House Hearings, supra note
30, at 111 (testimony of Owen Bieber, President, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America).
" Telephone interview with Cynde Harris, Risk Manager, Keith
Uddenberg, Inc. (Nov. 1, 1994).
156 Id.
15 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 223 (statement of Joseph
Dear).
158 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-24-045 (1992).
... Letter from Cynde Harris to Greg Watchman, supra note 90 (enclosing
company's Risk Management Action Plan).
160 Id.; Telephone Interview with Cynde Harris, supra note 155.
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The company began to implement the SHCs' suggestions,
confirming its commitment to safety and earning the trust of
workers. According to the company's risk manager, employees
became far more conscious of safety while performing their
jobs.' 6 ' In addition, a "cooperative spirit" developed between
workers and management.
162
The establishment of a strong SHC at each of the company's
stores had a substantial impact on work-related injuries and
illnesses. Between 1989 and 1992, the company dramatically
reduced its workers' compensation claims by almost forty per-
cent. By 1992, the company's experience rating, which had been
above the industry average, was 33.9% below the industry aver-
age." In contrast, the Monfort Company maintained a weak
SHC at its meatpacking facility in Grand Island, Nebraska.
The SHC met only on rare occasions, and kept no written
records."M The company, not the workers, selected the em-
ployee members, marking the committee as a management or
public relations device rather than a cooperative effort between
workers and management.
65
In 1989, an employee was injured while working on a
defleshing machine. The machine, about the size of a small
van, removes flesh and hair from cattle hides by pressing the
hides through a series of rollers. The employee's hand was
amputated when it became caught in the rollers.
166
After the injury, neither the company nor the SHC took
steps to provide the lockout devices and safety guards necessary
to prevent another accident. Instead, the company continued to
operate the machine with only one of five required lockout
devices.16' Not coincidentally, the absence of those devices
161 id.
16 2 id.
"a 1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, 117, at 223 (statement of
Joseph A. Dear).
14 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 171 (testimony of Michael
Wright, Director, Health, Safety and Environment Department, United
Steelworkers of America).
165Id.
16 Id. at 171-72.
167 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 167 (testimony of Bonnie
Skala).
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and guards allowed the company to run the processing lines
much faster. 6 '
In October of the following year, another employee was per-
forming maintenance work on the same defleshing machine. As
he leaned inside the machine to look for a pair of dropped pliers,
a co-worker slipped, accidentally activating the machine. The
employee's head was crushed between the rollers, killing him
instantly.'69 After an inspection, OSHA levied a one million
dollar fine against Monfort. ° In 1993, Nebraska enacted a
statutory SHC requirement for all employers subject to the
state's workers' compensation law.''
In sum, Keith Uddenberg, Inc. improved worker safety and
health by establishing strong, active SHCs, allowing employees
to elect their own representatives, and empowering the SHCs to
hold regular meetings, conduct inspections, and make recom-
mendations.
Monfort's SHC, however, did not represent workers' interests,
met infrequently, lacked significant responsibilities, never
earned workers' trust, and ultimately failed to protect the
company's employees.
G. COSHRA's SHC PROPOSAL: ADVANCING WORKER SAFETY
AND HEALTH
In 1991, Congress began to consider comprehensive reform
of the twenty-year-old federal OSHA statute for the first
time. 7 2  On August 1, 1991, Senators Edward M. Kennedy
and Howard M. Metzenbaum introduced the Comprehensive
Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act (COSHRA) in the
Senate. 73 Representative William D. Ford introduced com-
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-443 (Supp. 1993). The Nebraska law provides for
an equal number of management and worker representatives in non-union
settings; in unionized shops, committees are to be established through
collective bargaining. Id. The law requires employers to compensate SHC
members for time spent on committee activities. Id.
172 Congress has amended the OSH Act only once since its 1970 enactment,
increasing the maximum civil penalties in 1990. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title IHI, § 3101, 104 Stat.
1388-29 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. V 1993)).
173 137 CONG. REc. S11,833 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (introduction of S.
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panion legislation in the House of Representatives on the same
day.1
74
COSHRA represents a major overhaul of the original
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The legislation promises
to strengthen the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's traditional enforcement and standard-setting
authority. It proposes new initiatives, including safety and
health committees, to increase cooperation between manage-
ment and workers.175
Title II of COSHRA requires each employer of eleven or
more full-time employees to establish a joint health and safety
committee (SHC). 176 Title H also provides minimum require-
ments for SHC composition and functions. COSHRA's SHC
proposal adopts many features of successful SHCs, promising
workers a meaningful voice on safety and health issues.
Under COSHRA's SHC proposal, SHCs would be worksite-
based, to ensure a community of interests among represented
workers. Each SHC would be comprised of both management
and employee representatives, facilitating a cooperative ap-
proach to the identification and correction of hazards. After
electing their own representatives, workers will likely view the
SHC as a legitimate and trustworthy employee voice on safety
and health issues. 77
1622).
174 137 CONG. REC. H6316 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (introduction of H.R.
3160).
175 COSHRAs major provisions include: (1) requiring employers to
establish safety and health programs and joint safety and health committees;
(2) expanding the Act's coverage to include federal, state, and local govern-
ment workers; (3) streamlining the standard-setting process to roughly 18
months; (4) requiring specific standards on exposure monitoring, medical
surveillance, and ergonomics; (5) authorizing OSHA to require immediate
abatement of workplace hazards; (6) ensuring affected employees the right to
participate in OSHA proceedings; (7) expanding the Act's criminal penalty
provisions for employer violations causing death or serious bodily injury;, (8)
strengthening the Act's whistleblower protection provisions; and (9) improving
occupational safety and health data collection efforts. See 137 CONG. REC.
S11,839-44 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991).
176 See id. at S11,834-35. The legislation would authorize OSHA to modify
the SHC requirement for multi-employer worksites (such as construction
projects), worksites with fewer than 11 employees, and situations in which
employees do not primarily report to or work at a fixed location. Id.
171 Id. COSHRA provides that the number of management representatives
may equal but not exceed the number of employee representatives. In
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COSHRA clearly defines each SHC's rights in order to
guarantee that SHCs established under Title II would not be
"paper tigers."'78 Under the COSHRA proposal, each SHC
would have the right to review the employer's safety program
and injury and illness logs; investigate incidents resulting in
illness, injury or death; conduct inspections of the workplace at
least every three months and in response to complaints; inter-
view employees; and observe monitoring of employee exposure
to toxic substances.'79 Finally, each SHC would have the
right to recommend improvements in worker protection.80
After seven hearings, the House Committee on Education
and Labor met on May 28, 1992 to consider COSHRA."8'
Chairman Ford offered a substitute amendment, which the
Committee adopted by voice vote."8 2 The Committee then
favorably reported COSHRA, as amended, by voice vote. 183
The Chairman's substitute amendment modified Title II of
COSHRA in two significant respects. First, the amendment
allowed employers to apply to OSHA for a variance from the
SHC requirement. To obtain a variance, an employer would
have to establish an alternative employee participation program
that guaranteed meaningful employee participation "in a man-
ner which is at least as effective" as a SHC; allowed employee
participants to act in a representative capacity on behalf of
other workers; and provided participants with the same rights
granted to SHC members under COSHRA."' The Committee
report on COSHRA lists several examples of acceptable alterna-
addition, it includes minimum requirements for the number of employee repre-
sentatives. For worksites of between 11 and 50 employees, the committee
would include at least one employee representative. For worksites of between
51 and 99 employees, the committee would include at least two employee
representatives. Committees at larger worksites would include an additional
representative for each additional 100 employees at such worksites (up to a
maximum of six). Id.
178 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
79 See 137 CoNG. REC. S11,839-44 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991).
'go See id.
181 H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 35, at 24 (listing hearings held on Sept.
12, 1991; Nov. 21, 1991; Feb. 26, 1992; Mar. 5, 1992; Apr. 2, 1992; Apr. 8,
1992; and Apr. 29, 1992).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 6, 56-57.
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fives: periodic safety and health meetings with employee-
selected representatives, systems of multiple committees for
various hazards, full-time employee safety and health represen-
tatives, and work teams where all workers are given rights to
inspect and make recommendations. 1" Second, the substitute
amendment eliminated the requirement that employee repre-
sentatives be elected by secret ballot in nonunion workplaces.
Instead, the amendment simply requires that employee repre-
sentatives be "selected" by employees. 86
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
held five hearings on COSHRA in the 102nd Congress, and met
to consider the bill on September 16, 1992.18 Senators Ken-
nedy and Metzenbaum proposed a substitute amendment, which
the Committee adopted by voice vote.'88  The Kennedy-
Metzenbaum amendment parallels the House Committee's
amendment in its elimination of the secret ballot election
requirement for nonunion workplaces. 8 9 The Committee ap-
proved the amended bill by a vote of ten to six, with one mem-
ber voting "present."'90 The 102nd Congress adjourned with-
out consideration of COSHRA by the full Senate or House.
Consideration of COSHRA resumed early in the 103rd
Congress, with Representative Ford reintroducing the legisla-
tion on March 10, 1993,1'1 and Senators Kennedy and
Metzenbaum reintroducing its companion measure the following
day. 92 The House Education and Labor Committee and its
Subcommittee on Labor Standards, Occupational Safety and
Health, held seven hearings on COSHRA during the 103rd
'85 Id. at 57.
"6 Id. at 56.
187 S. REP. No. 453, supra note 30, at 8, 10 (listing hearings. held on Oct.
29, 1991; Nov. 5, 1991; Mar. 17, 1992; May 6, 1992; and June 10, 1992).
'mId. at 8.
189 Id. at 26.
190 Id. at 10 (Sens. Kennedy, Pell, Metzenbaum, Dodd, Simon, Harkin,
Adams, Mikuiski, Bingaman and Wellstone voting in favor; Sens. Hatch,
Kassebaum, Jeffords, Coats, Thurmond, and Cochran voting against; and Sen.
Durenberger voting "present").
'9' 139 CONG. REC. H1163, E588-89 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (introduction
of H.R. 1280).
192 139 CONG. REC. S2805-20 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (introduction of S.
575).
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Congress. 9 ' On March 10, 1994, the Committee adopted a
substitute amendment and favorably reported the bill by a vote
of twenty-six to seventeen,1 4 without significant modification
of Title II. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources and its Subcommittee on Labor, held four hearings on
COSHRA during the 103rd Congress. 9 5  Eventually, the
103rd Congress adjourned without further consideration of
COSHRA in either house.
196
III. THE CASE FOR SHCs AS A MEANS OF
IMPROVING LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
COSHRA's SHC requirement seeks to foster effective labor-
management cooperation through employee participation.
Nevertheless, COSHRA's opponents claim that such participa-
tion would run afoul of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act,'97 which prohibits employers from dominating
or interfering with labor organizations. COSRHA's opponents
base these assertions on two recent rulings, Electromation
98
and DuPont,99 in which the NLRB held two employee partici-
pation programs violated Section 8(a)(2).
In fact, COSHRA contains an explicit safe harbor that
immunizes the required SHCs from attack under Section
19s H.R. REP. NO. 825, supra note 35, at 32. The fifll Committee held
hearings on April 28, 1993, and July 29, 1993. Id. The Subcommittee held
hearings on July 14, 1993; July 21, 1993; September 28, 1993; October 20,
1993; and February 10, 1994. Id.
194 Id.
195 The full Committee held hearings on July 14, 1993; February 9, 1994;
and March 22, 1994. The Subcommittee held one hearing on October 19,
1993.
196 Notably, Senator Kassebaum introduced an alternative OSHA reform
bill on March 17, 1994. 140 CONG. REC. S3234-38 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994)
(introduction of S. 1950). Senate Bill 1950 provided an exemption from
general OSHA inspections for employers who engage in "regular consultation"
with workers and allow workers to make recommendations regarding safety
and health hazards. Id. No action was taken on Senator Kassebaum's legisla-
tion in the 103rd Congress.
197 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1988)).
198 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994).
199 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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8(a)(2)."' Moreover, even without that safe harbor,
COSHRA's SHC proposal is fully consistent with both the letter
and intent of the NLRA. The required SHCs would ensure
meaningful employee involvement in workplace safety and
health issues, free of employer domination. In addition, the
SHCs would foster increased cooperation between management
and workers by uniting them in pursuit of a common goal.
A. THE ORIGINS OF NLRA SECTION 8(A)(2)
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act 0' in
1933 granted American workers a federally protected right to
organize and engage in collective bargaining. In response,
thousands of employers set up "company unions" to thwart
independent organizing efforts. Management typically doininat-
ed these company unions, ostensibly established in the name of
employee representation.0 2 As NLRB Member Devaney re-
cently observed, such organizations "creat[ed] the illusion of a
bargaining representative without the reality.
20 3
During consideration of the National Labor Relations Act
(then known as the "Wagner Act") in 1935, Congress heard
ample testimony about the spread of company unions, labor-
management committees, and other management-sponsored
employee representation programs.20 4  As a result, Senator
Wagner recognized the need to protect employees' right to
independent self-organization and stated that "[t]he greatest
obstacles to collective bargaining are employer dominated
unions... [T]he very first step toward genuine collective bar-
gaining is the abolition of the employer-dominated union as an
agency for dealing with grievances, labor disputes, wages, rules,
or hours of employment."2 5  Thus, Congress included in the
2
"0 See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
201 Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), decl'd unconst., A-L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 195 U.S. 495 (1935).
212 See generally Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 992-94 (1992)
(discussing legislative history of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA).
213 Id. at 999 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
204 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1545-46 (1949)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 19581.
205 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 204, at 15-
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Wagner Act a provision designed to allow employees to deal
with their employer regarding wages and working conditions,
free of employer pressure or control.
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes employer domination or
interference with the formation or administration of any labor
organization an unfair labor practice." 6 Under Section 2(5),
the term "labor organization" includes, inter alia, an employee
representation committee set up to allow employees to deal with
the employer concerning conditions of work."' As the NLRB
recently recognized, Section 8(a)(2) was considered "a critical
part of the Wagner Act's purpose of eliminating industrial strife
through the encouragement of collective bargaining. 2 °5
B. THE EMERGING CONTROVERSY
In the late 1970s and 1980s, U.S. employers began to face
increasing competition from abroad for both U.S. and foreign
market shares. They searched for new methods of improving
productivity and efficiency. Many opted for employee participa-
tion programs such as quality circles, self-managed work teams,
grievance adjudication or other committees, joint training
programs, information forums, task forces, and more informal
communications between workers and management.0 9
16 (1949); see also Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, supra note 204, at 40-41, reprinted in 1 NLRB, at 1416-17 (state-
ment of Sen. Wagner) ("Collective bargaining becomes a sham when the
employer sits on both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the
spokesman of those with whom he is dealing.").
206 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer... to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.").
207 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988) (defining "labor organization" as "any orga-
nization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work").
Notably, because the Supreme Court interpreted the term "dealing with" more
broadly than the term "collective bargaining," it may apply even where neither
workers nor management contemplate the negotiation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
208 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 992.
209 See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, supra note 100, at 29-30 ("[Slince the 1980s there has been a sub-
stantial expansion in the number and variety of employee participation ef-
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Today, an estimated 30,000 employee participation pro-
grams exist, involving millions of employees.21 The Commis-
sion on the Future of Worker-Management Relations reported
that most large employers have established such programs. 1'
The Commission also concluded that "many small firms have
more informal processes for employee participation," and that
"between one-fifth and one-third of the workforce [as a whole] is
covered by some form of employee participation."1 2
With the proliferation of employee participation programs,
the labor relations community has increasingly focused on the
extent to which Section 8(a)(2) restricts an employer's ability to
establish such programs. In recent years, this issue has
emerged at the forefront of labor-management relations.
Much of this attention has been spurred by two recent
NLRB decisions. In Electromation, Inc.,213 the NLRB ruled
that Electromation violated the NLRA by dominating "action
committees" set up to deal with employee concerns about wages
and working conditions. A few months later, in E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 214 the Board held that Dupont had unlawfully
dominated its safety and health committees. Together, these
two decisions triggered a spate of law review articles215 and
forts."); THOMAS A. KoCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1987); Randolph M. Hale, The New Industrial Rela-
tions in a Global Economy, 37 LAB. L.J. 539 (1986).
... See Janet Novack, Make Them All Form Unions, FORBES, May 11, 1992,
at 174.
211 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 100, at 34 (citing 1987 and 1990 U.S. General Accounting Office
surveys and 1991 survey by Paul Osterman); see also Christopher J. Martin,
Electromation and its Aftermath, 19 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 133, 134
(1993).
2
" Id. at 36. Similarly, a recent National Safety Council survey suggests
that a majority of U.S. firms with 50 or more employees have established
SHCs. PLANEK & KOLOSH, supra note 86, at 6 (of 249 respondent firms, 75%
of those with 50 or more employees had established SHCs, and 31% of those
with fewer than 50 employees had established SHCs). See generally Charles
J. Morris, From Crisis to Cooperation: A New Direction in Industrial Rela-
tions, Address at the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Conference on Labor Law and
Industrial Relations (Sept. 19, 1994), in [1994] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 180,
at D-1 (Sept. 20, 1994).
213 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
214 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
215 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company
Union" Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the
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substantial media attention,216 helped lead the Secretaries of
Labor and Commerce to establish the Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations,217 produced efforts
in Congress to amend Section 8(a)(2), 218 and spawned a na-
tional debate on the efficacy and legality of employer-created
employee participation programs.219
NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Note, Labor-Management Cooperation
After Electromation: Implications for Workforce Diversity, 107 HARV. L. REV.
678 (1994); Martin T. Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the
NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127 (1993); Dennis M. Devaney, Much Ado About Section
8(a)(2): The NLRB and Workplace Cooperation After Electromation and Du
Pont, 23 STETSON L. REV. 39 (1993); Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination
of Labor Organizations and the Electromation Case: An Empirical Public
Policy Analysis, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1812 (1993); Clyde W. Summers,
Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section
8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129 (1993); Martin, supra note 211, at 133; Ste-
phen S. Schlossberg & Steven M. Felter, Electromation and the Future of
Labor-Management Cooperation in the U.S., 43 LAB. L.J. 608 (1992).
216 See, e.g., Bill Montague, Labor Board: DuPont Must Kill Committees,
USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 6B; William Grady, Court Weighs Labor-Man-
agement Groups, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1993, (Business) at 1; Jube Shiver, Jr.,
NLRB Orders DuPont to Deal Directly With Union, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993,
at D1; Frank Swoboda, NLRB Ruling Tests How Much Companies Trust Their
Workers, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at H2; Barbara P. Noble, Setback for
Labor-Management Teamwork Efforts, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at A23;
Dallas Gatewood, Unions Say Employee Committees Are Trespassing on Their
Turf, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1992, at 98; Novack, supra note 210, at 174.
217 See Reich, Brown Announce New Panel to Examine Workplace Coopera-
tion, Employee Participation, [19931 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at AA-1
(Mar. 25, 1993).
218 See 139 CONG. REc. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of S.
669, the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, by Sen. Kassebaum);
139 CONG. REC. H1738 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of H.R. 1529,
the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, by Rep. Gunderson); 140
CONG. REC. S14,113 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (introduction of S. 2499, the
Worker-Management Relations for the 21st Century Act, by Sen. Pell).
219 See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Case Holds Key to U.S. Competitiveness,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1 (quoting management labor lawyer who de-
scribed the Electromation case as "a struggle for the soul of the NLRB"). For
their part, labor unions have generally embraced employee participation
programs established jointly through the collective bargaining process, and
have endorsed COSHEA's SHC requirement. See, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearings,
supra note 34, at 46 (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer,
AFL-CIO) (estimating that half of all collective bargaining agreements include
SHC provisions and endorsing COSHRA's proposal). At the same time, labor
unions have expressed deep skepticism about most employee participation
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMNTEES
C. THE ELECTROMATION DECISION
Electromation, Inc.22  ivolved an Elkhart, Indiana
employer's creation of five "action committees" to allow workers
and management to "talk back and forth" about pay scales,
smoking and attendance policies, and other issues.22' Six
employee representatives (selected by voluntary sign-ups) and
two or three management representatives comprised each action
committee.2" Electromation's management unilaterally deter-
mined the committees' structure, policy goals, and functions,
and retained the right to terminate the committees at anyte 223
time.2
Within a few weeks after the committees were formed,
Local 1049 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
sought recognition from Electromation to serve as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the company's rank-and-file em-
ployees.2 ' After Local 1049 lost a representation election, it
filed an unfair labor practice charge against Electromation,
charging that the company's establishment of action committees
had violated Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.
The NLRB, in a decision by Chairman Stephens and Mem-
bers Devaney, Oviatt, and Raudabaugh, found that the action
committees constituted "labor organizations" because they
allowed employees, in a representational capacity, to "deal with"
management regarding the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment.22' The Board emphasized that management had set
up the action committees "in order to achieve a bilateral solu-
tion to [employees'] problems.1226
The Board further found "no doubt" that the company had
dominated the action committees in violation of Section
programs unilaterally established by employers. See, e.g., Owen E. Hernstadt,
Why Some Unions Hesitate to Participate in Labor-Management Cooperation
Programs, 8 LAB. LAW. 71 (1992).
220 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
21309 N.L.R.B. at 991.
22 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
2Id. at 997.
226 Id.
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8(a)(2). 227 The Board noted that management had created the
action committees with little support from employees and that
management had determined their composition, functions, and
duration.22' Electromation's management had been "sitting on
both sides of the bargaining table with an 'employee committee'
that it could dissolve as soon as its usefulness ended and to
which it owed no duty to bargain in good faith." 9
The Board held that Electromation had "imposed on [its]
employees its own unilateral form of bargaining or dealing" in
a manner designed "to create in employees the impression that
their disagreements with management had been resolved
bilaterally.'230 The Board thus ordered Electromation to "im-
mediately disestablish" the action committees.23'
The Board carefully limited the impact of its decision,
noting that its findings were "not intended to suggest that
employee committees formed under other circumstances for
other purposes would necessarily be deemed 'labor
organizations' or that employer actions like some of those at
issue here would necessarily be found, in isolation or in other
contexts, to constitute unlawful support, interference, or domi-
nation." '32 Member Oviatt observed that "this case presents
little more than garden variety 8(a)(2) conduct," adding that the
Board's "narrow and unremarkable" ruling had little impact on
existing case law.233
Electromation appealed the Board's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.2 ' Two years
later, the Seventh Circuit rejected Electromation's petition to
set aside the Board's order and granted the Board's cross-peti-
tion for enforcement.2 35 The court found that Electromation's
27 Id.
228 Id. at 997-98.
Id. at 998 n.30.
230 Id. at 998.
31 Id.
2 2 I d. at 990.
13 Id. at 1004 n.2 (Oviatt, Member, concurring).
' Electromation Files Appeal Challenging NLRB Holding on Employee
Action Committees, [1993] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at A-7 (Jan. 6, 1993).
The Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on September 27, 1993. See
Electromation Asks Seventh Circuit to Overturn Labor Board's Decision, [1993]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 190, at A-1 (Oct. 4, 1993).
2 Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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management had exerted an unacceptable degree of control and
influence over the action committees by unilaterally creating
them, determining their agenda and functions, and retaining
unilateral power to terminate themY6 The committees thus
"lacked the independence of action and free choice" guaranteed
by the National Labor Relations Act."
D. THE DuPONT DECISION
In E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,1 8 the NLRB consid-
ered the applicability of Section 8(a)(2) to employee participation
programs established by an employer in a unionized workplace.
DuPont's management unilaterally set up SHCs to award safety
incentives (including cash bonuses) and to offer proposals on
workplace safety and health.239 It also conducted safety and
health conferences, in which employees offered ideas for improv-
ing workplace safety.'
The Board held that DuPont's SHCs constituted "labor
organizations" within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the NLRA
because they constituted a bilateral mechanism through which
employees "dealt with" management about working condi-
tions. " The Board further held that DuPont's management
had unlawfully dominated the SHCs because it had retained
unilateral power to decide SHC composition, structure, and
functions, to select employee representatives, to-veto proposed
SHC action, and to terminate the SHCs at will.'4 The Board
ordered DuPont to disband the SHCs.2"
In a concurring opinion, NLRB Member Devaney asserted
that DuPont had used the committees to get "on both sides of
the bargaining table"'' and "to freeze the Union out of areas
in which it had a vital and legally recognized interest: employ-
2
'a Id. at 1170.
237 Id.
238 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
2
'
9 Id. at 894-95.
240 Id. at 896.
21 Id. at 894-95.
22 Id. at 895-96.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 903.
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ee health and safety..., bonuses, and employee grievances over
safety." '245 He explained his reading of Section 8(a)(2):
I read Section 8(a)(2)'s legislative and precedential
history as leaving employers significant freedom... to
involve rank-and-file workers in matters formerly seen
as management concerns .... Section 8(a)(2) should not
create obstacles for employers wishing to implement
[employee participation] plans--as long as such pro-
grams do not impair employees' free choice of a bar-
gaining representative.... [Section 8(a)(2)] does, how-
ever, outlaw manipulating such committees so that
they appear to be agents and representatives of the
employees when in fact they are not.26
In contrast to its conclusions about DuPont's SHCs, the
Board held that the company's safety conferences constituted a
lawful means of involving workers in safety issues.2 7 The
Board rejected the NLRB General Counsel's contention that the
conferences had enabled DuPont to bypass the union and to deal
directly with employees on a mandatory subject of bargaining,
in violation of the company's duty to bargain with the union in
good faith. The conferences served as communications devices
rather than bilateral processes through which management
could deal with workers on safety issues. The Board observed
that allowing individual workers to make suggestions and offer
ideas on their own behalf, without acting as representatives, did
not usurp the union's role as the workers' exclusive bargaining
representative.2" In fact, the Board cited the conferences as
an example of how an employer could structure an employee
participation program without running afoul of Section8(a)(2)." 9
E. REACTION TO ELECTROMATION AND DUPONT
The labor relations community eagerly anticipated the
Electromation and DuPont decisions, believing they would
245 Id. at 898.
246 Id. at 899.
247 Id. at 896-97.
249 Id.
249 Id. at 897.
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impact broadly the viability of management-worker cooperative
efforts. The Board, however, took pains to limit its holdings to
the facts of each case and generally adhered to Section 8(a)(2)
case law decided between 1935 and 1991. Member Devaney
stressed that Section 8(a)(2) would continue to provide "signifi-
cant latitude" to employers seeking to involve employees in the
workplace."' The decisions nevertheless produced a consider-
able outcry from segments of the employer community.
2 5 1
Management lawyers warned that the rulings placed employee
participation programs "in danger of extinction. ''1 2 The Wall
Street Journal called the rulings "idiotic" and ominously predict-
ed that for thousands of employers, "a litigation nightmare
awaits." 3  A representative of the National Association of
Manufacturers warned that the Board was likely to find a
violation of Section 8(a)(2) "any time a company works directly
with its employees to discuss and address workplace issues
without the involvement of a labor union."
254
The Labor Policy Association (LPA), an employer group
representing nearly 200 major American corporations, de-
nounced the Electromation ruling as "totally unresponsive to
modern workplace realities. '255  A Marriott Corporation offi-
cial later testified on behalf of the LPA, asserting that "[the two
decisions] raise substantial doubt about the legality of virtually
any type of cooperative effort - other than a traditional labor
250 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 999 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
"' See, e.g., Regional Public Hearing Before the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Jan. 5, 1994) (testimony
of Anthony Byergo, management labor lawyer) (concluding that the.Board's
present reading of § 8(a)(2) "does not meet the needs of a twenty-first century
workplace"); CHARLES W. BAIRD, CATO INST., ARE QUALITY CIRCLES ILLEGAL?
GLOBAL COMPETITION MEETS THE NEW DEAL at exec. summary page (1993)
(observing that in the wake of the Electromation ruling, "labor-management
cooperation on a wide range of issues is illegal" unless a union is involved).
2 Gregory J. Kramer et al., The New Legal Challenge to Employee
Participation, 45 LAB. L.J. 41 (1994).
Os Quality Circle Busters, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1993, at A12.
954Making the Future Work: Technology, Workers and the Workplace:
Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Hearings on
S. 1020J (statement of Mary Harrington, Director of Corporate Labor Rela-
tions, Eastman Kodak Company, on behalf of National Association of Manufac-
turers) (emphasis added).
11 Swoboda, supra note 216, at H2; Noble, supra note 216, at A23.
1994]
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union - through which employees and managers address
matters relating to the employees' jobs, working conditions, the
workplace environment and the like."25
Several members of Congress also protested. Representa-
tive Steve Gunderson declared that the Electromation ruling
had invalidated all employee participation programs in which
worker representatives speak on behalf of other workers.Y
Senator Nancy Kassebaum warned that "the [NLRB] and the
Federal courts have interpreted the [NLRA] to prohibit employ-
ers and employees from cooperating with each other., 25  Spe-
cifically, Senator Kassebaum expressed her view that "any
workplace-involvement committee where workers express their
desire to management to modify their work environment vio-
lates Federal labor law." 9  In 1993, Kassebaum and
Gunderson introduced legislation to overturn the Board's
Electromation decision. °
Others within the labor relations community, including
management representatives, labor law academics, and govern-
ment officials, downplayed the significance of Electromation and
DuPont, emphasizing instead the continued viability of many
forms of employee participation. Secretary of Labor Reich
expressed his belief that the Electromation ruling did not
threaten labor-management collaboration, but he promised to
monitor future Board decisions on the issue. 1  Professor
Charles J. Morris called Electromation "an obscure garden-
variety company-union case" that did not deserve the attention
it received from the employer community.262  Shortly after
leaving the NLRB, former member Raudabaugh declared that
256 1993 Senate Hearings on S. 1020, supra note 254, at 92 (emphasis
added).
" See Steve Gunderson, NLRB Muddies Regulatory Waters, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 1993, at A10.
258 139 CONG. REc. S4014 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993).
259 id.
260 See 140 CONG. REC. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of S.
669, Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, by Sen. Kassebaium); 140
CONG. REC. H1738 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of H.R. 1529, Team-
work for Employees and Management Act, by Rep. Gunderson); see generally
app. infra at 124-126 (describing congressional efforts to overturn the
Electromation decision).
261 Frank Swoboda, See Reich Vows to Preserve Workplace Cooperation;
Secretary Would Seek Labor Law Changes, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at D3.
262 See Morris, supra note 212, at D-3.
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"much of the outcry over [Electromation] reflects Beltway
interest group exaggeration and rhetoric.""26 NLRB Member
Devaney agreed, commenting that the "sky-is-falling" mentality
of some in the business community warranted little merit.2'
Many management representatives also downplayed the
significance of the Electromation and DuPont decisions.2 6 5
Management attorney John S. Irving, a former NLRB Chair,
stated that "these dire predictions about the loss of an impor-
tant employer communications tool are exaggerated." 66  Ed-
ward B. Miller, also a former NLRB Chair, declared that the
"'so-called Electromation problem' is simply a 'myth."'26  He
candidly warned against repeal of Section 8(a)(2): "While I
represent management, I do not kid myself. If Section 8(a)(2)
were to be repealed, I have no doubt that in not too many
months or years sham company unions would again recur. "26
In sum, despite some claims to the contrary, the
Electromation and DuPont decisions have left ample room for
employers to establish bona fide employee participation pro-
grams. Professor James Rundle, in his study of Section 8(a)(2)
case law, found that the Board typically struck down employee
participation programs only where the employer had also
engaged in other unlawful conduct.269  As he concluded, "in
actual practice, [Section] 8(a)(2) has had virtually no impact on
good-faith experimentation with employee involvement.2 70
21 Seventh Circuit Endorses NLRB Holding on Joint Employee Involvement
Committees, [1994] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 179, at AA-1, AA-2 (Sept. 19,
1994).
2M Id.
' See, e.g., Labor Law Precedents Will Fall, Management Attorney Warns
SHRM, [1993] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at C-1 (May 25, 1993) (reporting
comments by management attorneys Harold P. Coxson and Betty Southard
Murphy that Electromation affirmed existing case law).
2 66 JOHN S. IRVING, UNION PLANS TO AmEND THE LABOR LAws 16 (5 Na-
tional Legal Center for the Public Interest, White Paper No. 2, 1993).
26
'Former NLRB Chairman Calls Electromation Problem 'Myth, [1993]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at A-5 (Oct. 20, 1993) (summarizing Miller's
testimony before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations).
268 Id.
219 See James R. Rundle, The Debate Over the Ban on Employer Dominated
Labor Organizations: What Is the Evidence?, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAw 161, 166 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
270Id. at 164.
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Moreover, the Board has not prioritized enforcement of Section
8(a)(2). Between 1989 and 1993, the Board issued an average of
fewer than ten complaints per year involving employee partici-
pation programs, out of the thousands of complaints issued
during that period."' Finally, even if the NLRB ruled that an
employee participation program had violated Section 8(a)(2), the
remedy would be extremely limited. At worst, the Board would
order the employer to disestablish its employee participation
program, 2 allowing it to start over.
F. DESIGNING A LAWFUL SHC
The Electromation and DuPont decisions provided an
opportunity for the NLRB to synthesize earlier decisions and
federal case law to resolve Section 8(a)(2) issues. Taken togeth-
er, the two decisions serve as a roadmap for employers and
workers wishing to construct lawful employee participation
programs in the future.
From the outset, Congress intended Section 8(a)(2) to
proscribe employee participation programs only to the extent
that they interfere with employee rights to organize indepen-
dently for collective bargaining purposes. 3  Subsequent acts
of Congress have confirmed this view.2 4 The Senate Report
on the original Wagner Act stated that Section 8(a)(2)'s purpose
was "to remove from the industrial scene unfair pressure, not
fair discussion." '275 Accordingly, the NLRB and the federal
271 See Challenges to Legality of Joint Committees Form Small Part of
NLRB Workload, ABA Told, [1993] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at C-1
(Aug. 11, 1993).
272 See Martin, supra note 211, at 139.
273 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB,
supra note 204, at 1104.
274 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 175a (1988) (provision of Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
directing Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service "to provide assistance in
the establishment and operation of plant, area and industrywide labor
management committees"); 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(9) (1988) (provision of Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947 banning employer financial support of labor organizations,
but, as amended by the Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978, exempt-
ing contributions made "to a plant, area or industrywide labor management
committee").
215 S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 273, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 204,
at 1104. Congress included a provision in § 8(a)(2) specifically providing that
"an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
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courts have validated many employee participation programs
that provide meaningful employee involvement without employ-
er domination or interference.1 6
The Board's rulings in Electromation and DuPont reaffirm
this basic framework. Member Devaney stressed that the
NLRA "should not create obstacles for employers wishing to
implement [employee involvement programs] - as long as those
programs do not impair the right of employees to free choice of
a bargaining representative."2 77
How, then, can employers continue to make use of employee
participation programs without running afoul of Section 8(a)(2)?
An analysis of Section 8(a)(2) involves two principal issues:
first, whether the employee participation program constitutes a
"labor organization" as defined by Section 2(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act,27s and second, whether the employer
unlawfully dominated or interfered with it.
The first principal inquiry requires a three-part analysis.
An employee participation program is likely to be deemed a
labor organization if employees act in a representative capacity,
the program establishes a bilateral process by which employees
deal with their employer, and the subject of such dealings in-
volves wages, benefits, or working conditions.279 Programs
such as work teams (where all employees participate) or brain-
storming sessions (where individual employees make sugges-
tions on their own behalf) are not labor organizations because
employees participate only in an individual capacity. 8 0 Con-
versely, an employee participation program may be a labor
organization where management, or the workers themselves,
select a subset of workers to represent employee interests.28 '
(1988).
276See infra notes 280, 282, 285-286 and accompanying text.
277 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 311 NLRB 893, 899 (1993)
(Devaney, Member, concurring).
278 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
27 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., General Foods Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977) (finding no
violation where all employees participated in work teams as part of a job
enrichment plan).
21 See, e.g., NCR Corp., No. 9-CA-30467, 1994 NLRB LEXIS 353 (NLRB
Div. of Judges, Dayton, Ohio May 26, 1994) (finding of administrative law
judge that satisfaction councils collectively constituted a labor organization
where employer established them to represent workers' interests in dealing
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An employee participation program does not constitute a
labor organization simply because management has granted it
decision-making authority (as in a grievance adjudication
committee),282 or because it allows employees to communicate
with their employer. A program that establishes an ongoing
bilateral process, facilitating a dialogue between workers and
management, however, may be deemed a labor organiza-
tion.283
Even where the first two conditions are satisfied, a program
will be deemed a labor organization only if the issues within the
scope of its consideration include wages, benefits, working
conditions and other issues within the province of collective
bargaining.28 An employee participation program designed to
address issues such as efficiency, productivity, or quality is not
likely to be considered to be a labor organization.285 Indeed,
with management).
282 See, e.g., Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977) (no
violation where labor-management committee performed adjudicative function
resolving employee complaints); Spark's Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276
(1977) (no violation where labor-management council performed adjudicative
function resolving employee grievances). Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides
that although an elected union is the exclusive bargaining representative, "any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted"
without the union's intervention. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Medical Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262,
1272-73 (4th Cir. 1994) (in absence of ongoing bilateral process, hospital's
nursing services organization constituted a communications device rather than
a labor union; isolated instances of management responding to employee
proposals did not constitute "dealing"); NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S.
203 (1959) (upholding NLRB's finding of violation where employer-created
labor-management committees regularly made proposals to management
regarding working conditions); Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 405 (1987)
(finding violation where employee committee made proposals regarding
vacations and holiday schedules).
' See generally St. Vincent's Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B. 84 (1979) (finding viola-
tion where employee committee made proposals regarding wages, hours, and
vacations); see also NCR Corp., No. 9-CA-30467, slip op. at 15, 1994 NLRB
LEXIS 353, *40 (May 26, 1994) (finding violation where employer created sat-
isfaction councils "to serve as a vehicle for rank-and-file employees to deal
with [NCR's] management" on issues such as wages, benefits, and working
conditions).
' See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 244 (1985) (finding no
violation where labor-management communications committee performed
managerial, non-representative function, in seeking to improve efficiency).
Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Electromation, NLRB Member Oviatt
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the Board has never ordered an employer to disestablish an
employee participation program set up to promote efficiency,
quality, or productivity. 6
Most employee participation programs do constitute labor
organizations within the meaning of NLRA Section 2(5), as
NLRB Member Raudabaugh recognized in Electromation 7
However, a program deemed to be a labor organization may still
be lawful under Section 8(a)(2) if the employer does not domi-
nate or interfere with it.28
The second principal inquiry is largely procedural. An
employer dominates and interferes with an employee participa-
tion program when it unilaterally creates the program, unilater-
ally determines its purpose, structure, composition, functions
and processes, and unilaterally holds the right to terminate the
program at will.2"9 Similarly, where the employer exercises
control or veto power over the program's agenda, the employer
will be seen as "sitting on both sides of the bargaining ta-
ble."'29 In contrast, an employer does not dominate or inter-
fere with an employee participation program where employer
and employees jointly establish the program, jointly determine
its purpose, structure, composition, functions and processes,
exercise equal control over the program's agenda, and retain an
equal voice in deciding whether and when to terminate the
program.
Thus, the Electromation and DuPont decisions provide some
well-marked signposts to guide employers and workers who seek
to establish employee participation programs. The analysis
suggested that quality circles, quality of work-life programs, joint problem-
solving structures, communication mechanisms, and other employee partici-
pation schemes aimed at improving quality, efficiency or productivity do not
violate § 8(a)(2). Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1004-05 (1992), enfd,
35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
' Rundle, supra note 269, at 173.
28 309 N.L.R.B. at 1008 (Raudabaugh, Member, concurring).
"8 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S.
241 (1939) (finding violation where employer controlled form and structure of
employee committee and retained unilateral veto power over proposed
committee actions); see also NCR Corp., No. 9-CA-30467, 1994 NLRB LEXIS
353 (NLRB Div. of Judges, Dayton, Ohio May 26, 1994) (finding § 8(a)(2)
violation where employer created satisfaction councils and determined their
charter, composition, and fimctions without employee input).
' See supra notes 229, 245 and accompanying text.
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boils down to one fundamental issue: Does the program foster
genuine employee involvement and therefore improve labor-
management relations, or does it simply create "the illusion of
a bargaining representative without the reality?"29'
G. COSHRA'S SHC PROPOSAL: ENSURING MEANINGFUL
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT WITHOUT EMPLOYER DOMINATION
Opponents of COSHRA's SHC requirement fear that the
proposed SHCs would run afoul of Section 8(a)(2) as interpreted
by the NLRB in Electromation.9 2 In response, COSHRA's
House and Senate sponsors added language providing that "[a]
safety and health committee established under and operating in
conformity with [COSHRA] shall not constitute a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of [the NLRA]. ' 293  The Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources further clarified its
belief that "committees established under [COSHRA] would not
pose a problem under [S]ection 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act," even without the added language.294 Indeed,
the safe harbor provision is unnecessary. Application of the
Section 8(a)(2) two-part analysis set forth above demonstrates
the legality of SHCs as a means of fostering meaningful employ-
ee participation without employer domination or interference.
Admittedly, a SHC established pursuant to COSHRA would
likely constitute a "labor organization" under Section 2(5) of the
NLRA. Employee members of the SHC would clearly act in a
representative capacity, having been selected by the workforce
291 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 999 (1992) (Devaney, Member,
concurring), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
29 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 35, at 142 (1992) (statement of
Minority Views) (expressing concern that "employers would be caught in a
'Catch-22' of being mandated to implement a committee by [COSHRA] but in
doing so, being faced with potential violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA");
1 1991-92 House Hearings, supra note 30, at 342 (testimony of Chemical
Manufacturers Association) ("[Miandatory committees may constitute an
unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act.").
293 See S. REP. No. 453, supra note 30, at 8, 10, 170 (reflecting language
included in sponsors' substitute amendment, adopted by the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and favorably reported on Sept. 16, 1992, by a
vote of ten to six, with one member voting "present"); H.R. REP. No. 663,
supra note 35, at 6, 24 (reflecting language included in sponsors' substitute
amendment, adopted by the House Comm. on Education and Labor and favor-
ably reported on May 28, 1992, by voice vote).
294 S. REP. No. 453, supra note 30, at 27.
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as a whole for that very purpose. The SHC would establish an
ongoing, bilateral process for employees to deal with their
employer. Finally, the subject matter of that dialogue, worker
safety and health, clearly would involve issues of working
conditions within the scope of the collective bargaining process.
Nevertheless, the structure contemplated by COSHRA
would protect the SHC from employer domination or interfer-
ence, thus preventing a violation of Section 8(a)(2). Consider
the definition of "domination" offered by the NLRB in
Electromation: "a labor organization that is the creation of
management, whose structure and function are essentially
determined by management,.., and whose continued existence
depends on the fiat of management, is one whose formation or
administration has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2). 295
Under COSHRA's requirements, employers would set up
joint safety and health committees, but they would do so pursu-
ant to a mandate from Congress, not as a freely determined
unilateral act. 6  The structure, purpose, composition and
functions of the SHCs would be determined by Congress, rather
than by the employer. Moreover, employers would not be free to
terminate SHCs at will.
Under COSHRA, employees would select their own repre-
sentatives, who would comprise at least fifty percent of the
committee membership. Management would select its represen-
tatives, but would have no voice in the selection of employee
representatives. Employee and management representatives
would determine jointly the SHC's agenda and management
would not hold a veto power. In addition, each SHC member
could make recommendations to the employer, ensuring employ-
ee representatives a meaningful role in addressing safety and
health issues, even in the event of a committee deadlock.
COSHRA's structure would thus ensure meaningful employ-
ee involvement in workplace safety and health issues, free of
" Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148
(7th Cir. 1994).
See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text (discussing the House
version of COSHRA, which permits an employer with an equally effective
alternative employee participation program to apply to OSHA for a variance
from the SHC requirement). The House bill requires such alternatives to
include employee representation and certain minimum employee rights.
Conceivably, an employer could establish an alternative employee participa-
tion program consistent with COSHRA's requirements, but so dominate it as
to raise the spectre of unlawful domination in violation of § 8(a)(2).
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unlawful employer domination or interference. Such genuine
involvement "is in no way inimical to the free exercise of the
right of employees to choose a bargaining representative.1297
Thus, the SHC requirement is fully consistent with both the
letter and spirit of Section 8(a)(2), even without the safe harbor
included in COSHRA.
The SHC requirement would help to foster improved labor-
management relations as a whole, as many employers have
attested in congressional hearings. According to Ford Motor
Company, "[tihe establishment of joint committees within Ford
facilities has promoted a spirit of teamwork... that improves
working conditions for all employees.... In a work atmosphere
where there has traditionally been an adversarial working
relationships [sic], joint health and safety committees have
helped reduce conflict by demonstrating that our objectives are
the same--an accident-free work environment.
298
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPT OF
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The 1991 fire at Imperial Food's poultry processing
plant 299 bore a striking resemblance to another workplace
tragedy of eight decades earlier. In 1911, some 500 immigrant
women and girls toiled long hours making low-cost shirts in the
top floors of the cramped, ten-story building of the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company in New York City.300  Although the
297 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1003 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
298 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 201 (statement of Anthony
Ruggiero, Union Relations Coordinator, North American Automotive Opera-
tions, Ford Motor Company). Surprisingly, some employer representatives
and some Republicans have asserted that COSHRA's SHC requirement would
damage labor-management relations. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 825, supra note
35, at 257 (stating Minority Views of Republican members of House Comm. on
Education and Labor that COSHRA's SHC requirement "is designed for
confrontation rather than cooperation"); 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33,
at 346 (statement of American Bakers Association) (fearing that committees
required by COSHRA "likely will heighten adversarial tensions"); id. at 344
(statement of American Ambulance Association) ("[Tihe practical impact of
mandating joint safety committees is to create an adversarial la-
bor/management relationship."). Critics of COSHRA's SHC requirement
offered no anecdotal or systemic evidence that the SHCs required by law in
thirteen states negatively affected labor-management relations.
See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
s See Laurie Goodstein, 1911 N.Y. Factory Fire Brought Wave of Reform,
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plant's floors were littered with flammable shirt fabric, the
company locked the doors from the outside during employees'
shifts.3 ' The building had no sprinklers and only one fire
escape."°2 The plant's few fire hoses were rotted through..
and, despite four previous fires, the company did not conduct
regular fire drills.30  The factory workers, struggling to make
a new life in America, feared losing their jobs if they complained
about the dangerous conditions.0 '
On the afternoon of March 25, 1911, shirt fabric caught fire
on the eighth floor.30 ' The fire spread quickly, and panicked
workers tried to flee the building.0 7 Many workers were
trapped behind the plant's locked front doors, while others leapt
from windows and down elevator shafts to escape the smoke
and flames, their hair and clothes on fire. 8' The sole fire
escape collapsed under the weight of too many workers.0 9
One hundred and forty-six women and girls died in the
blaze.31°
Several commissions investigated the Triangle Shirtwaist
fire, inspiring a national campaign for worker safety.311 Thir-
ty-six states passed protective occupational safety and health
laws in the ensuing years." Some years later, a plaque was
placed at the factory site, inscribed with the words, "On this
site, 146 workers lost their lives in the Triangle Shirtwaist Co.
fire on March 25, 1911. Out of their martyrdom came new con-
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A12.
301 Id.
302 Id.; see 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 69 (testimony of Eula
Bingham, former Assistant Secretary of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S.
Department of Labor).
303 Goodstein, supra note 300 at A12.
'" 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 69 (testimony of Eula
Bingham).
305 Id.
" Goodstein, supra note 300, at A12.
307 See id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 1991 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 70 (testimony of Eula
Bingham).
31 Id.
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cepts of social responsibility and labor legislation that have
helped make American working conditions the finest in the
world."3
13
In the eight decades since the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, the
United States has achieved some improvements in workplace
safety and health. The state laws passed just after the 1911
fire and subsequent state and federal efforts have established
the importance of worker safety as a public policy objective. In
turn, many U.S. employers have made their workplaces much
safer.
As the 1991 Imperial Food fire demonstrated, however, the
job is far from finished. Frightening parallels can be seen
between that tragedy and the Triangle Shirtwaist fire eighty
years earlier: at both plants, exit doors were locked from the
outside despite substantial fire hazards; both companies failed
to install adequate fire suppression systems or to conduct fire
drills, even after several earlier plant fires; and many workers
died trying to escape each blaze. The similarities between these
two tragedies, nearly a century apart, cast doubt on the reality
of this nation's progress in protecting its workers.
The Imperial Food fire represents just one incident, but that
plant's sweatshop conditions reflect those of far too many
American workplaces. While twenty-five workers died in that
1991 blaze, more than ten times as many American workers die
from safety accidents or occupational disease every single
working day.314 Far from an anomaly, the Imperial Food fire
symbolizes a national crisis in occupational safety and health,
and underscores the need for a new public policy approach to
protect American workers. Federal policy makers can no longer
ignore the number of work-related fatalities, nor the fact that
most of these fatalities easily could be prevented. Instead, they
must recognize the reality that federal law has fallen consider-
ably short of its original promise of ensuring a safe and health-
ful workplace for all Americans.
COSHRA's proposed SHC requirement represents a new
public policy approach designed to succeed where existing
measures have failed. Its approach is both "safe" from the
standpoint of protecting workers, and "sound" from the stand-
point of labor-management relations. The experiences of thou-
sands of U.S. firms already using SHCs demonstrate their effec-
313 d. at 72.
314 See S. REP. NO. 453, supra note 30, at 2.
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tiveness in reducing work-related injuries, illnesses, and fatali-
ties. SHCs further provide an effective means of fostering
meaningful employee involvement free of employer domination.
For these reasons, a broad range of interest groups has
banded together as the Coalition for Safe Jobs to seek enact-
ment of COSHRA. The Coalition includes public health organi-
zations, civil rights groups, labor unions, environmental organi-
zations, religious groups, consumer advocates, and other socially
active interest groups.315 ' The National Safety Council has
also endorsed the concept and purpose of COSHRA's proposed
SHC requirement."1 6
If Congress enacts COSHRA or other legislation requiring
the establishment of SHCs, perhaps the workers at Imperial
Food will not have died in vain. Perhaps, like the workers who
died in the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, their deaths will produce a
new public policy approach to worker safety, one that embodies
Ila new concept of social responsibility."
3 As of March, 1994, the membership of the Coalition for Safe Jobs
included: the American Public Health Association, the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO and its affiliated
unions, Public Citizen, the Environmental Defense Fund, Citizen Action, the
United Methodist Church Board of Church and Society, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, OMB Watch, the American Lung Association, the Sierra Club,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the American Nurses Association, the National
Council of La Raza, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the National
Rainbow Coalition, the Occupational Health Foundation, the NAACP, the
United Church Board for Homeland Ministries, the National Consumers
League, Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace, the National Wildlife
Federation, the Consumer Federation of America, the National Education
Association, the Farmworker Justice Fund, Americans for Democratic Action,
the Washington Association of Churches, 26 local Committees on Occupational
Safety and Health (COSH) around the nation, and a host of other organiza-
tions. Coalition for Safe Jobs, Members of the Coalition for Safe Jobs:
National Organizations List 1-2 (March 1, 1994) (on file with author).
316 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 384.
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APPENDIX
CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO AMEND SECTION 8(A)(2)
Members of Congress introduced legislation to amend
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act even before
the NLRB issued its 1992 decision in Electromation, Inc. Repre-
sentative Tom Campbell introduced the American Compet-
itiveness Act in 1991.' The legislation would have added a
proviso to Section 8(a)(2) stating that "nothing in this paragraph
shall prohibit the formation or operation of quality circles or
joint production teams composed of labor and management, with
or without the participation of representatives of labor organiza-
tions. 2
In 1993, Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Representative
Steve Gunderson introduced legislation to overturn the Board's
Electromation decision.3 The bill proposed to amend Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA to allow employers "to establish, assist,
maintain or participate in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate to discuss matters of
mutual interest... and which does not have, claim or seek
authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments... with the employer." The bill would establish a very
broad exception to Section 8(a)(2)'s prohibitive rule, one that
might swallow the rule itself. Any employer domination or
interference with a labor organization would be permissible in
the absence of a collective bargaining agreement or negotiations
toward such an agreement. Thus, an employer's unilateral
determination of purpose, structure, membership, and functions
would become irrelevant to the legality of an employee partici-
pation program. Management could even override employee
opposition to its creation of the program.
At a 1994 meeting of the Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee, Senator Kassebaum proposed Senate Bill
669 as an amendment to Senate Bill 1020, the Workers Technol-
1 See 137 CoNG. REc. E2048-49 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
2 See H.R. 2523, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a) (1991).
3 See 140 CoNG. REc. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of S.
669, the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act of 1993, by Sen.
Kassebaum); 140 CONG. REC. H1738 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introduction of
H.R. 1529, the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act of 1993, by
Rep. Gunderson).
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ogy Skill Development Act.4 The Committee rejected the
amendment by a ten to seven vote.5 Senator Kassebaum also
included language comparable to Senate Bill 669 in OSHA
reform legislation she introduced in 1994.6 The 103rd Congress
took no action on that legislation, on Senate Bill 669, or on
House Bill 1529.' Representative Steve Gunderson also at-
tempted another means to achieve Section 8(a)(2) re-
form - broadening COSHRA's safe harbor for SHCs. The
House Committee on Education and Labor met to consider'
COSHRA in March of 1994.' Representative Gunderson offered
an amendment to allow any OSHA-approved alternative em-
ployee participation program to consider issues other than
safety and health.' More importantly, the Gunderson amend-
ment would have exempted any "employee participation commit-
tee" from the reach of Section 8(a)(2), regardless of whether its
purpose was the improvement of worker safety and health, and
regardless of whether it was established in compliance with
COSHRA's requirements. On March 9, the Committee voted
twenty-six to fifteen to reject the amendment.0
4 See Senate Labor Committee Approves Workplace, Education Technology
Bills, [1994] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-18 (Feb. 24, 1994). S. 1020,
introduced by Senator Wofford of Pennsylvania, proposed to create a grants
program to ensure worker involvement in the development of high-perfor-
mance workplaces. See 139 CoNG. REc. S6455 (daily ed. May 25, 1993).
5 139 CONG. REC. S6455 (daily ed. May 25, 1993) (all 10 Committee Demo-
crats voting against the amendment and all seven Committee Republicans
voting in favor of it). Id.
6 140 CONG. REC. S3234-38 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994) (introduction of S.
1950). Representative Harris Fawell introduced similar legislation in the
House. 139 CONG. REC. H6378 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993).
7At the conclusion of the 103d Congress, S. 669 had nine sponsors
(Senators Kassebaum, Gorton, Hatch, Jeffords, Thurmond, Gregg, Danforth,
Grassley, and Craig), while H.R. 1529 had 26 (Representatives Gunderson,
Goodling, Porter, Livingston, Barrett of Nebraska, Hoekstra, Boebmer, Fawell,
Crane, Zeliff, Bateman, Bereuter, Petri, Coble, Upton, Ballenger, Emerson,
Hoke, Hutchinson, Linder, Hayes, Hall of Texas, Quillen of Tennessee,
McMillan, Sundquist, and Portman).
8 H.R. REP. No. 825, supra note 35, at 32.
'See Ford Amendment Reflects DOL's Views; House Labor Committee
Rejects GOP Proposal, [1994] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at A-6 to A-7
(Mar. 3, 1994).
" GOP Amendment Over Employee Committees Rebuffed by House Labor
Panel Democrats, [1994J Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at A-4 (Mar. 10, 1994).
Committee Chairman William D. Ford had tentatively accepted the amend-
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Committee Chairman William D. Ford explained that the
Gunderson amendment would "open up the National Labor
Relations Act to the very kind of abuse that the original lan-
guage was intended to prevent."" In response, Representative
Gunderson labelled the Committee's action "crass politics" and
accused the committee of mandating safety and health commit-
tees while simultaneously denying employers the ability to work
voluntarily with employees toward improving quality, productiv-
ity, and efficiency. 2 Representative Gunderson protested that
the Committee was taking "a huge step backwards in assisting
America to become competitive in a global, high-tech mar-
ket."13
At the conclusion of the 103rd Congress, Senator Pell also
introduced legislation to amend Section 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act.'4 Senator Pell explained that current
federal labor law makes labor-management cooperation "difficult
at the least and impossible at best."'5  Thus, Senator Pell
proposed to amend Section 8(a)(2) to allow employers and
employees (by majority assent) to establish committees jointly
"to discuss matters of interest and concern."' 6 The bill would
require an equal number of employee-elected and management
representatives to comprise each committee. 7
ment on March 2, 1994, indicating a desire to consult with the NLRB before
reaching a final decision. After consultation with the Board, Ford rejected the
amendment because it would "do mischief to the National Labor Relations
Act." Id. at A-5. The Committee favorably reported the Comprehensive
Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act on March 10, 1994, by a vote of 26
to 17. House Panel Clears Democratic OSHA Bill, Rejecting GOP Proposals to
Soften Mandates, [1994] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at A-i (Mar. 11, 1994).
Congress took no further action on the bill in 1994.
" GOP Amendment Over Employee Committees Rebuffed by House Labor
Panel Democrats, supra note 10, at A-5.
12 id.
13 1d.
14 140 CONG. REc. S14,113 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (introduction of S. 2499,
the Worker-Management Relations for the 21st Century Act of 1994, by Sen.
Pell).
15 Id.
16 Id. at S14,114.
17 1d.
